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ABSTRACT 
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Since the Justice and Development Party came to power, Turkey has turned into an 
active and dynamic donor country in the foreign aid arena from being only a receiver 
country. Recent developments of Turkish foreign aid policy and the rise of activities of 
Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) becomes evident as the most 
prominent success stories of Turkish foreign policy in the last decade. Understanding 
the underlying mechanism that led to such a remarkable change constitutes the main 
motivation of this study. To that end, the dialectical relationship among the main 
institution of Turkish foreign policy (i.e., Westernization), Turkish foreign aid agent 
(i.e., TIKA) and contextual factors (i.e., domestic developments in the AKP era) is 
scrutinized in the light of theoretical assumptions of flexible version of Historical 
Institutionalism (HI). By focusing on dialectical relationship, this study gives equal 
weight to evolution of the concept of Westernization, domestic developments in the 
AKP era, and transformation of TIKA as explanatory determinants in explaining the 
policy change in Turkish foreign aid policy. In this regard, the study puts forward that 
the concurrent occurrence of these determinants in the AKP era have played a major 
role for emergence of the change in Turkish foreign aid policy. 
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ÖZET 
AKP DÖNEMĠ TÜRK DIġ YARDIM POLĠTĠKASI: TARĠHSEL 
KURUMSALCILIĞI YENĠDEN DÜġÜNMEK 
 
 
NAZLI TÜRKER 
Siyaset Bilimi Yüksek Lisans Programı, Tez, 2015 
 
DanıĢman: Prof. Dr. Bülent Aras 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Türk DıĢ Politikası, Türk DıĢ Yardım 
Politikası, TIKA, Tarihsel Kurumsalcılık 
 
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi hükümeti döneminde, Türk dıĢ yardım politikası büyük bir 
değiĢime uğramıĢtır. Bu süreçte Türkiye sadece dıĢ yardım alan bir ülkeden dıĢ yardım 
veren bir ülkeye dönüĢmüĢtür. Bu alanda yaĢanan geliĢmelerle birlikte Türk ĠĢbirliği ve 
Koordinasyon Ajansı‟nın (TĠKA) faaliyetlerindeki artıĢ son 10 yılda Türk dıĢ 
politikasının baĢarı öyküsü olmuĢtur. Söz konusu değiĢime sebep olan faktörleri 
anlamak ve açıklamak amacıyla yola çıkan bu çalıĢma, tarihsel kurumsalcılığın 
varsayımları doğrultusunda, Türk dıĢ politikasının temel kurumu olan Batıcılık, Türk 
dıĢ yardım politikasını uygulumakla görevli olan kurum TĠKA ve AKP dönemindeki 
bağlamsal faktörler arasındaki diyalektik iliĢkiyi analiz etmektedir. Bu doğrultuda, bu 
çalıĢma Türk dıĢ yardım politikasındaki yaĢanan değiĢimin bahsi geçen tüm faktörlerin 
aynı anda ortaya çıkması sonucunda gerçekleĢtiğini savunmaktadır.  
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the prominent developments of the world politics in the last decade has been the 
transformation of the most of the emerging economies into significant foreign aid 
donors. Across the Global South, Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs) have 
facilitated debt cancellation, provided loans and grants, and engaged in development 
projects and humanitarian assistance in Less Developed Countries (LDCs). Unlike the 
main foreign aid donors such as the United States, United Kingdom and Germany, these 
countries are not members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development‟s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) – the main 
regulatory institution of overseas development assistance (ODA) flows from advanced 
industrialized countries to LDCs. Among one of the notable emerging powers, Turkey 
has also been following this trend in the recent years. Latest developments of Turkish 
foreign aid policy and the rise of activities of Turkish Cooperation and Coordination 
Agency (TIKA), which is responsible in conducting foreign aid policy, are the most 
prominent success stories of Turkish foreign policy in the last decade. As of today, 
Turkey has transformed itself into an active and dynamic donor country in the foreign 
aid arena from being only a receiver, which eventually has been offered a seat in DAC 
by the leading countries of foreign aid. Such a remarkable change in Turkey‟s role in 
international arena with regard to foreign aid constitutes the motivation of this study for 
understanding the underlying mechanism. 
Although Turkey attempted to develop its foreign aid policy for the first time in 
1990s, there was hardly any progress in this policy arena. As a first step, Turkish 
authorities established TIKA in 1992 to promote Turkish foreign policy goals by 
helping the development of newly independent states of Central Asia, Caucasus and the 
Balkans with regard to economy, infrastructure, commerce, culture, and education. This 
aid flow continued until the end of the 1990s with ups and downs related to domestic 
politics in Turkey. Yet, domestic problems that Turkey had been encountering such as 
fragile coalition governments, their conflicting foreign policy visions, and economic 
crisis in 1994 prevented Turkey to develop an effective and influential foreign aid 
policy in terms of scope and the number of activities until the beginning of 2000s.  
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Since 2002, when the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi – AKP) came to power, Turkish foreign aid policy has entered a process of 
transformation. Over the years, foreign aid has become the invisible hand of Turkish 
foreign policy to increase Turkey‟s capability of influencing different countries across 
the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia that were not among the major 
geographical scope of previous governments‟ foreign policies. In other words, through 
the transformation of Turkish foreign aid program in the AKP era, Turkey has extended 
its global outreach. During this period, Turkey‟s aid donations have increased in a more 
stable fashion and the areas subject to receiving aid have been diversified in comparison 
to 1990s. 
Turkey has also succeeded to become more integrated to international politics 
through its newly established foreign aid policy. When the recent developments in the 
foreign aid arena are examined, it is seen that Turkey has not only increased its social, 
political and economic level of cooperation with the Middle Eastern or African 
countries but it has also become an important player in several multilateral 
organizations, such as the OECD, United Nations Development Program, United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization, Food and Agricultural Organization of 
the United Nations. With the aim of realizing the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) of the United Nations inside and the outside of the country, Turkey has 
established several policies in foreign aid arena through  following international trends 
on development with the aim of strengthening its stance in the global arena.   
 Along with the changes in Turkish foreign aid program, TIKA has been 
immediately transformed and it has adopted a new terrain in foreign aid activities. The 
number of TIKA offices increased to 33 in 2013 which was only 12 in 2002. Moreover, 
TIKA has become an agency that conducted activities over 100 countries from the 
Pacific to Central Asia, from the Middle East to Africa, from the Balkans to Caucasia 
and to Latin America. Turkey also donated tens of millions in disaster relief to 
Indonesia in 2005 and Haiti in 2010 in the wake of natural calamities. Yet, it was in 
Somalia where Turkey‟s importance was recognized for the first time by the 
international community for being the main player in development arena. Besides 200 
projects conducted in Somalia, the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became 
the first non-African leader who visited Somalia in nearly two decades and called the 
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international community to join Turkey in contributing to development process of 
Somalia.  
TIKA activities tripled between 2002 and 2010 in comparison to its first decade 
of establishment and the total amount allocated to development aid reached to $1.5 
billion in 2012. When this increase is taken into account, it becomes evident that the 
scope of Turkish foreign aid policy has substantially changed in the last decade. After 
many years of being a recipient of development aid, Turkey has turned into an 
important donor country, assisting more than 100 other countries in 2000s. In fact, 
Turkey has succeeded to become the fourth largest donor in proportion to its Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), according to the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report of 
2013. In the light of these developments, this study asks that what is the underlying 
mechanism that led to such a change in foreign aid policy of Turkey in the AKP era?  
In this regard, the present study aims to answer this question and to analyze the 
main determinants behind this change. To understand Turkey‟s foreign aid journey from 
being a receiver to becoming an important donor country, this study analyzes domestic 
developments in the AKP era which constituted the sufficient conditions of this change 
in foreign aid policy. In an attempt to provide an answer to this question, flexible 
version of Historical Institutionalism (HI) is determined as the theoretical background 
of the study. In the light of theoretical assumptions of HI, this study hypothesizes that 
the dialectical relationship among the main institution of Turkish foreign policy, 
Turkish foreign aid agents, and contextual factors which are attributed to domestic 
developments in the AKP era constitutes the main determinants of the change in Turkish 
foreign policy in 2000s.  
The history of Turkish foreign policy shows that Turkey followed cautious 
policies towards its neighborhood before AKP. The main motivation behind those 
cautious policies stemmed from previous governments‟ commitment to 
„Westernization‟ mission and not to be perceived as deviating from it. However, in the 
light of changing contextual factors since 2002, Turkish foreign policy makers have 
opted for a multi-dimensional approach through application of new instruments with the 
new interpretation of Westernization which is the embedded institution of Turkish 
foreign policy. In addition, political stability and democratization process, growth in 
Turkish economy and the novel ideational structuring in Turkish foreign policy are 
determined as contextual factors while TIKA is identified as the main government 
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agency in conducting foreign aid policy.  Therefore, Westernization maintains its role in 
drawing the lines of foreign policy formulation, its interaction with contextual factors 
and the agent has stimulated the change in the foreign aid arena in the AKP period. 
In line with the aim of this study, examining contextual factors with regard to 
considering sequence and timing of the change underpins the general outline of the 
present study. At that point, the analysis of development of TIKA as the engine of 
foreign aid policy constitutes the case of this study. Focusing on TIKA‟s  
transformation process provides a valuable ground for analyzing the impact of 
contextual factors on the occurrence of the change in foreign aid policy by isolating the 
effect of Westernization in Turkish foreign policy and the agent since they were both 
present before the change took place.  
From a methodological perspective, qualitative research method is used in this 
study. First, descriptive research method is used through examining of secondary 
sources in order to elucidate theoretical basis of this study along with contextual factors 
pointed above. Furthermore, the change in Turkish foreign aid policy and 
transformation of TIKA are elaborated by analyzing its organizational structure, its 
projects and the scope of activities. In this regard, the primary sources such as annual 
reports and other published documents of TIKA as well as scholarly articles are 
examined. Finally, several in-depth interviews are conducted at TIKA office in Ankara 
to deepen the understanding of TIKA‟s transformation, its functioning, and its mission 
within the Turkish foreign policy. In addition to the interviews with TIKA experts, 
several meetings are conducted with academics and high-level bureaucrats about 
Turkish foreign policy in the AKP era and the Westernization genesis of Turkish 
foreign policy. Yet, TIKA experts who generously shared their experiences through 
interviews for the purposes of this study wish to remain anonymous. For this reason, 
any information related to their personal information is excluded from the study.    
This study is structured as four main parts discussing different aspects of the 
question of interest. The objective of the first part is to discuss the theoretical 
foundation of the study which sets out the arguments of HI. Besides explaining the 
evolution of HI over time, the second strand of HI, which is also referred as the flexible 
version of HI is clearly elucidated and the main theoretical determinants are identified 
under the framework that is drawn by this approach. The second part begins with the 
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discussion about Westernization genesis of Turkish foreign policy and its evolution. In 
this part, a specific focus was given to Turkey‟s alignment with the West specifically 
with regard to relations with the US and the EU both in the period previous to AKP 
government and during AKP era. Through presenting the historical overview, the roots 
of the commitment to the West become clear while the change in the perception of the 
West in foreign policy formulation during AKP period is becoming evident.  
The third part of the study focuses on domestic developments in Turkey under 
AKP rule. In this part, political stability and democratization movement in Turkey are 
explained with respect to AKP‟s success in consecutive elections and democratic reform 
packages. Then, the section continues with the economic growth that started with the 
IMF stabilization programs in the beginning of 2000s. Finally, the third part concludes 
with the novel ideational structuring of Turkish foreign policy with specific references 
to theoretical foundations, new instruments and tools, and the resurfacing the idea of 
West in the following years after the 9/11 events, EU membership process and the Arab 
Spring. The last part of the study focuses on the Turkish foreign aid policy from its 
establishment to date. In this regard, political environment in Turkey during TIKA‟s 
establishment, TIKA‟s main policies towards its neighborhoods and its organizational 
transformation are examined in detail. In the analysis part following these arguments, 
the way concurrent and dialectic occurrence of contextual determinants play a 
significant role in developing an active foreign aid policy in AKP are revisited in the 
light of theoretical and empirical evidences at hand. In this section, all pieces of this 
study are tried to be combined in a comprehensive manner with the aim of generating a 
sound argument.  
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PART I: HISTORICAL INSTUTIONALISM REVISITED  
This study aims to present a clear analysis of the change in Turkish foreign aid policy in 
AKP era which led to transformation of Turkey from a foreign aid receiver country to a 
donor country. Since the main aim is to explain this policy change, dialectical 
relationship among the agent, institutions, and the context come to the fore as the major 
part of analysis. In the case of examining Turkish foreign aid policy, each of those 
determinants deserves specific focus in understanding the underlying mechanism of 
such change. Regarding the Turkish foreign aid policy, it is evident that foreign aid 
policy has changed dramatically in the last 15 years. More remarkably, this change has 
been realized while the main government agent and main institution of Turkish foreign 
policy – TIKA and Westernization – remained their existence on foreign policy 
activities. In this regard, contextual factors seem to appear as the most determinant 
factors behind this change. Yet, disregarding the evolution and transformation of 
institution and the agent together with contextual changes would be misleading. 
Moreover, a thorough examination would reveal significance of the dialectical 
relationship among the institution, agent, and the contextual factors as the main 
determinants of the change in Turkish foreign aid policy. Thus, dialectical and 
concurrent existence of those determinants in the AKP era provides sufficient 
conditions for the change in Turkish foreign aid policy.  
This perspective in analyzing Turkish foreign aid policy shares similar research 
agenda with the so-called new institutionalism in political analysis. The significance of 
institutions in political science is emanated from the way it influences political 
outcomes through shaping the behavior or policy preferences of actors. Yet, this 
perspective provides a limited outlook on explanation of political outcomes because 
there are number of sources besides institutions, such as contextual or broader structural 
factors, that influence preferences of actors. Therefore, political analysis urges us to 
distinguish institutional factors from wider contextual factors. In this regard, flexible 
version of HI provides a valuable research agenda that helps to differentiate factors 
related to institutions, context, or political agents and thus unearthing the dialectical 
relationship among those factors will be realized. Besides, according to Sanders (2006), 
HI is more helpful in studying “human political interactions; in the context of rule 
structures that are themselves human creations; and sequentially, as life is lived, rather 
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than to take a snapshot of those interactions at only one point in time, and in isolation 
from the rule institutions in which they occur.” (p. 39) Examining the change in Turkish 
foreign aid policy requires having such a thorough and comprehensive perspective. As 
rule structures, domestic developments related to foreign aid policy in the AKP era, and 
as a rule institution, the role of Westernization and its impact on foreign policy 
outcomes have concurrently played a significant role in the evolution and functioning of 
TIKA as the main agent of Turkish foreign aid policy. Therefore, as an outcome of the 
dialectical relationship of those factors during the AKP era, the change in Turkish 
foreign aid policy becomes evident. In this regard, flexible version of HI with its focus 
on dialectical interactions and multi-faceted perspectives leverages the explanatory 
power of this study.   
Historical Institutionalism 
How do historical institutionalists define institutions? While some scholars 
underline formal rules and organizations (Streeck & Thelen, 2005), others try to 
incorporate both formal and informal rules in the definition of institutions (Marcussen, 
2000, Steinmo, 2008). One of the most common definitions of institutions given by Hall 
& Taylor (1999) is “formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions 
embedded in the organizational structure of the policy or political economy.” (p. 938) 
They are combinations of rules and assets transferred from the past (Clemens & Cook, 
1999, p. 445) and “embedded in concrete temporal processes” (Thelen, 1999, p. 371), as 
well as they are the results of “enduring legacies of political struggles.” (p. 388) In the 
light of these definitions, HI approaches institutions as formal organizations and 
informal rules and procedures at the same time. Norms and values are emanated from 
material institutions and they have crucial roles in establishing formal structures. In this 
regard, institutions are the ones that characterize political outcomes through structuring 
political circumstances (Thelen & Steinmo, 1998, p. 2; Taylor & Hall, 1996, p. 938). 
Thus, an analysis based on history is placed at the center of HI to unearth the reasons 
why actors pursue specific goals and strategies over the others (Thelen & Steinmo, p. 
9). While this institutional approach acknowledges free existence of political arena, it 
also takes formerly identified policies into consideration. Thus, the examination of 
institutions in HI reveals the impact of institutions on the outcome of contextual 
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processes by emphasizing the way institutions determine the constraints and shape 
political strategies and goals (p. 7).  
With regard to this study, examining Westernization in analyzing the change of Turkish 
foreign aid policy in the AKP era is crucially important since institutions along with the 
actors who are operating within them are able to mobilize institutional resources in 
political struggles and governance relationship. Levi (1990) argues that institutions 
contain and create power (p. 407), while Hall (1986) argues that “the organization of 
policy making affects the degree of power that any one set of actors has over policy 
outcomes” (p. 19). For instance, the impact of government agencies significantly varies 
from one another in terms of their interaction with different levels of government 
bureaucracy and institutional settings. In fact, this variation is obviously seen when the 
history of TIKA is considered. In 1990s, at the time when it was established, TIKA was 
not active in Turkey‟s surrounding regions since Westernization had been interpreted as 
being strictly aligned with Western countries. Any alternative policies developed 
towards the Balkans or the Middle East was refrained in order not to be seen as 
deviating from the Westernization ideal. Yet, with the conceptual evolution of 
Westernization, TIKA has turned into one of the most important agents of Turkish 
foreign policy who has been operating in wide range of continents simultaneously. This 
change in TIKA‟s behavior also proves that institutions play an important role in 
shaping political behavior and decision making process by having an influence on the 
perceptions and powers of political actors through different ways. In this regard, taking 
institutions as a process that shape political outcomes through a dialectical relationship 
rather than referring them as a „thing‟ appears as a thorough way to start institutional 
analysis. In this way, examining the evolution of institution in history becomes both 
likely and useful in analysis. 
HI, in general, examines the way institutions influence individual behavior and 
policy outcomes (Steinmo, 2008, p. 150). The research agenda of historical 
institutionalists are most likely to be puzzle driven and context sensitive (Thelen, 1999; 
Steinmo, 2008). As Kulawik (2009) states “the significance of specific phenomena is 
not only due to what they are but also to when they took place and their situatedness in 
relation to other factors and processes over time (p. 264). In addition, HI makes a point 
of contextuality, temporality, causality and path-dependency (Kulawik, 2009, pp. 262-
263). Contextuality refers “analyzing macro context and hypothesizes about the 
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combined effects of institutions and processes rather than examining just one institution 
or process at a time.” (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002, p. 696) While focusing on 
contextuality, temporality enters into the picture of HI analysis. Historical 
institutionalists “take time seriously, specifying sequences and tracing transformations 
and processes of varying scale and temporality” (Pierson & Skocpol, pp. 695-696). 
Hence, HI offers useful tools in analyzing why change occurs in some cases while 
inertia continues in other political circumstances.  
Contextualizing causal mechanism is also of significance to HI since it offers to 
explain a hypothesized cause in a given context and to underline the temporal aspects of 
the context (Falletti & Lynch, 2009, p. 1145). This emphasis on the sequencing of the 
input, the contextual change, and the output points out the interaction which Falleti and 
Lynch (2009) explain as follows: “The causal mechanisms by themselves do not cause 
outcomes to occur; rather, the interaction between causal mechanisms and context 
does.” (p. 1161) Finally, HI acknowledges the importance of the logic of path-
dependency. It suggests that “what happened at an earlier point of time will affect the 
possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time.” (Pierson, 
2004, p. 20) Hence, dealing with the contextual factors and using a historical process 
tracing methodology increase HI scholars‟ ability to explain changing political 
outcomes as well as the overarching macro-patterns (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002).  
Flexible Version of HI 
HI has recently undergone a theoretical improvement through gaining conceptual clarity 
and distinctiveness as a result of its collaboration with ideational approach and 
constructivism. This newly emerging strand of HI is called as the flexible version of HI. 
It has appeared against the orthodox approach that deals with highly constrained forms 
of agency and path-dependent structures and takes deterministic view of institutional 
and policy dynamics (Bell, 2011). The question of institution-agent and institutional 
change are main issues that flexible version of HI aims to create new points of views.  
First, on the institution-agent question, HI is criticized by constructivists on the 
grounds that its approach is over-dependent on institutions. Constructivist 
institutionalism stands against the orthodox view of institutions which are taking the 
role of agency as highly constrained by their institutional arrangements. Constructivist 
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institutionalism offers to concentrate upon the subjective ideational and inter-subjective 
discursive realm due to the way this „flexible‟ environment let agents to construct their 
realities and actions (Bell, 2011, p. 886). While Bell (2011) acknowledges the 
constructivist argument which asserts that the impact of institutions on agents are 
formed by agents themselves through ideational mechanisms, he argues that they fall 
short in grasping the dialectical relationship between institutions and agents.  
According to Bell, the constructivists could only grasp one dimension of the two-
way dialectical interplay between agents and institutions (p. 891). It is agreed that 
institutions are prior to the agents. They are equipped with the power that enabled to 
shape and even impose agents‟ behavior. In fact, this causal mechanism is the reason of 
conducting institutional analysis. Yet, constructivist institutionalists have concentrated 
upon the agency while the role of institutions has been receding. In contrast, flexible 
version of HI does not prioritize agents, institutions, structures, or ideas; rather it takes 
each as mutually constitutive in a dialectical manner (Marsh, 2009). In this regard, Bell 
states that “institutions are more than just real-time ideational artifacts but are more like 
inherited sets of rules and duties that need to be navigated and negotiated.” (p. 891). 
Further, the point that is missing from the recent constructivist approach is that “ideas 
do not come about in a vacuum – they are embedded in a historical context and need 
institutional support to be effective.” (Guzzini, 2000, p. 148) Rather, agents and 
institutions dialectically shape each other. This dialectical relationship among agents 
and institutions constitute the main point of interest of flexible version of HI. Flexible 
version of HI refuses the type of institutional analysis which places too much 
explanatory weight on agency. Adopting hybrid approach on the relationship between 
institutions and agents ensures the development of this kind of dialectical framework as 
well. Thelen and Steinmo (1992) state that: 
“Institutional analysis (…) allows us to examine the relationship between 
political actors as objects and as agents of history. The institutions that are 
at the center of historical institutionalist analysis (…) can shape and 
constrain political strategies in important ways, but they are themselves 
also the outcomes (conscious or unintended) of deliberate political 
strategies of political conflict and of choice.” (p. 10).  
By following the argument of Thelen and Steinmo, Bell points out that researchers 
should unearth the institutional black box and concentrate on the actions of strategic 
actors operating within shifting contexts (p. 892).  
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Second, the issue of explaining the institutional change is another point that historical 
institutionalists are mostly criticized for. Peters et al (2005) argue that although the 
main purpose of HI is to explain change, historical institutionalists have not fully 
developed a theory of change (pp. 954-955). Historical institutionalists attribute the 
sources of change only to the exogenous factors; hereby they “fall outside of the 
existing scientific theory (Mahoney, 2005, p. 514). As Steinmo et al (1992) state: 
“… institutions explain  everything  until  they  explain  nothing. Institutions  
are  an  independent  variable and  explain  political  outcomes  in  periods  
of  stability,  but  when  they  break down,  they  become  the dependent  
variable, whose shape is determined by the political conflicts that such 
breakdown unleashes. (…)  The  logic  of  the  argument  is  reversed  from  
„institutions  shape  politics‟  to „politics shape institutions‟” (p. 15). 
In the light of these critics in mind, flexible version of HI developed a more 
dynamic study of policy change (Bell, 2011). By taking agency into consideration and 
expanding contextual instruments through focusing on incremental changes rather than 
focusing only to exogenous factors, they go beyond present patterns. This new approach 
in HI puts forward that incremental changes can be as significant as dramatic 
punctuations in understanding the process of change. On the issue of incrementalism, 
the most acknowledged claim is that institutional change occurs through the negotiation 
of a new status quo among actors each of whom have different agendas and perceive 
different policy options and incentives for the changes they propose. Therefore, 
contextual factors as the main determinants of status quo constitute major parts of 
policy analysis. Yet, it is important to clarify the scope of contextual factors at that 
point. In general, crises, external shocks, such as wars or revolutions are pointed as 
contextual factors. Yet, many studies reveal that the scope of these kinds of definitions 
are subject to change or expand.   
As argued by Jessop (1990) and Hay (1996), contextual factors can contain wider 
political, economic or social phenomena which may create advantages or disadvantages 
for agents in favoring one choice or outcome to another. In contrast to the deterministic 
approach, political, economic or social structures, such as the age distribution in a 
population, the structure of the economy, or the distribution of power in government, 
ideational agendas have the ability to empower agents (Bell, 2011, p. 898). By the same 
token, Pontussen (2005) argues that “the centralization of state power might be 
considered a structural feature that underlies various political institutions” (p. 126).  
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Bell and Feng‟s (2014) study also unfold how economic transition and altering 
power dynamics in the Chinese Party State bring institutional change which has enabled 
the rise of the authority of the People‟s Bank of China. Similarly, by examining the 
dynamic relationship between the institution of Westernization and the changing 
context of European Union (EU) – Turkey relations, BölükbaĢı and Özçürümez (2011) 
analyze Turkey‟s changing foreign policy preferences regarding the European 
Neighborhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean. These studies reveal that 
dealing with „situated agency‟ or „agent in context‟ is crucial for having an approach 
which is able to unearth the way they interact with each other in ascertaining the change 
of political outcomes. In this study, Turkish foreign aid policy is analyzed through 
examining relationship between Westernization and changing contextual factors, 
namely domestic and international developments in the AKP era.  
Main Assumptions of the Study 
Having grasped the dialectical view to the relationship between the agent, institutions, 
and context, the approach applied to this study holds four main assumptions. 
1. Agents, institutions, and contextual factors are all analytically distinct from each 
other.  
In fact, this analytical distinction gives the opportunity to study institutions and 
wider context in a dialectical manner. In addition, holding analytical distinction in the 
research design helps to trace causal links between institutions and wider context.  
2. Institutions and structural context are pre-given, so they are not merely reducible 
to the agents that constitute them.  
The temporality feature of HI is critical at that point. Adler (1997) points out that 
social analysis should consider “antecedent conditions” (p. 330), while McAnulla 
(2006) emphasizes that “current activity and reflexivity always take place in a pre-
structured context” (p. 121). It should be also noted that although institutions and 
structures are not reducible to the agents, as Archer (1995) puts  “people are not puppets 
of structures because they have their own emergent properties which mean that they 
either reproduce or transform social structures rather than creating them” (p. 1), which 
brings us to the third assumption. 
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3. Agents, institutions, and structures are relating with one another in a dialectical 
manner.  
Agents do not act in an environment which is detached from the environment they 
operate within (Bell, 2011, p. 906). Archer‟s “morphogenetic” description of this 
dialectics deal with agents, institutions, and structures as mutually constitutive over time 
by means of recurring patterns of interaction. 
4. Agents are the ones that mediate institutional and structural influences.  
As ideational analysis holds the idea that “ideas do not come about in vacuum”, 
similar approach can be raised for the relationship between agents and institutions. As 
Archer (2000) states “structures only exert an effect when mediated through the 
activities of people.” Structures are only ever relational emergent and never reified 
entities existing without social interaction (p. 465). This suggests that the influence of 
institutions and structures over political outcomes is realized by agents.  
Main structure of this study is arranged in the light of these theoretical assumptions. 
As the hypothesis of the study suggests, the change in Turkish foreign aid policy in the 
AKP era is explained by reference to dialectical relationship among institutions, 
context, and agent. In other words, the concept of Westernization as the main foreign 
policy institution has been re-shaped due to its interaction with new contextual factors 
in the AKP era. In this study contextual factors are identified as ideational structuring in 
foreign policy, Turkish economic growth, political stability and democratization process 
in the AKP era. New activism in Turkish foreign aid policy is appeared through a 
concurrent occurrence of each determinant. While, on the one hand, interaction among 
domestic developments has played a mutually shaping role, on the other hand, they 
enhanced Turkey‟s policy making capacity at the global stage. At that point, TIKA, as 
the main government agency of Turkish foreign aid policy, comes into play in the 
establishment and implementation of foreign aid activities. In this regard, it can be 
argued that TIKA‟s organizational transformation enabled it to play a mediating role 
between institution and context. Hereby, shift in the meaning of Westernization and 
emergence of new contextual factors has reflected themselves through TIKA‟s policies 
in foreign aid arena.  
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Figure 1: Illustration of the Theoretical Argument 
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As explained above, this study hypothesizes that the dialectical relationship of 
domestic developments with the embedded institution of Turkish foreign policy 
constitutes the basis of the change in Turkish foreign aid policy. Although 
Westernization maintains its role in drawing the lines of foreign policy formulation, its 
interaction with contextual factors and the agent has endangered the respective foreign 
policy change.  
This study examines the historical development of TIKA by categorizing into 
two periods: from 1992 (the establishment of TIKA) to 2002, and from 2002 until 
present time. Through this categorization, the aim is to show the ways how change in 
TIKA activities has occurred by taking 2002 as the breaking point. The comparison 
between two periods reveals that although the existing institution (Westernization) and 
the government agency (TIKA) have remained to be present, there is a significant 
change in activities of TIKA in line with the newly emerging foreign aid policy.  
Emergence of this change points out changing contextual factors under AKP rule and 
their interaction with the existing institution and the agent itself. At this point, taking 
dialectical relationship among those three determinants into account becomes crucial in 
explaining foreign policy change. Therefore, impact of this interacting mechanism 
reflects itself in transformation of TIKA which is one of the most leading government 
agencies in implementing foreign aid policy of Turkey.  
Explaining the case of TIKA through the lenses of this approach provides 
leverage in determining the impacts of contextual factors and agents by isolating the 
effect of Westernization in Turkish foreign policy. This study accounts for changing 
domestic developments: i) ideational structuring of AKP foreign policy elites ii) relative 
growth of Turkish economy iii) political stability and democratization process. 
Combination of all these factors has enabled Turkish policy makers to re-interpret the 
institution of Westernization which facilitate the development of new policy strategies 
actualized by the situated government agency, TIKA. In the following parts of this 
study each determinants and the role they play in conducting foreign aid policy in the 
AKP era are clearly elucidated.  
The dialectical view of institutional analysis along with the underlying 
assumptions of interpretation, discretion, constraining and empowerment also 
strengthen explanatory power of this study. First of all, it leverages conceptual clarity 
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and analytical distinctiveness to the HI. Through re-considering major conceptual 
debates, like contextuality, temporality, institutional change, institution-agent, with a 
different point of view, this approach enables us to move beyond many problems 
unanswered by the sticky version of HI. Not being stuck in determinist view of path-
dependency, but highlighting historical mechanisms with regard to contextual factors 
gives us opportunity to reveal the way institutions do matter in determining political 
outcomes. Taking the effect of an ongoing institutional setting as controlled brings out 
the causal impact of the changing context alone. This combination of temporality and 
contextuality also forms the basis of the dialectical relationship between agents, 
institutions, and structures which overcome the dualism of structure-agency problem in 
HI. Finally, having considered incremental changes allows us to embrace endogenous 
dynamics in an analysis in which exogenous features can be connected to endogenous 
ones.  
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PART II: WESTERNIZATION AS THE GENESIS OF TURKISH FOREIGN 
POLICY 
Western oriented foreign policy formulation has constituted the genesis of Turkish 
foreign policy through identifying “the established order within the existing borders and 
balances.” (Oran, 2011, pp. 46-49) This genesis has ingrainedly manifested itself in 
different shapes in Turkish foreign policy formulation. Turkish foreign policy makers 
has approached to the West as a “state of soul” and as a route for the development 
instead of just a geographical location. With regard to this perception, Turkey was 
placed near the civilized, developed, and superior modern West against its Eastern 
antithesis (YeĢiltaĢ, 2013, p. 665). The only route for Turkey‟s modernization was 
determined as being part of Europe in political, economic, and civilizational terms 
(Kubicek, 2004, pp. 45-47).  
Similar to other less developed countries, Westernization was used as a 
substitute of modernization in Turkey in the early republic era. Through nation-building 
process, mental map of Turkish society was shaped by the idea that being Westernized 
is a sine qua non for modernization (Oran, p. 51). Naturally, the external relations with 
the West were determined as a product of this principle. YeĢiltaĢ (2013) points Turkey‟s 
this connection with the “West” as the regeneration of “universality of Western 
civilization within the foreign policy discourse.” (p. 665) In this regard, analyzing the 
“deliberate and continuous” effect of Westernization in Turkish foreign policy has 
become crucial to elucidate the way Turkey perceives its surrounding environment and 
develop its foreign policy strategy (Aydın, 1999, p. 160).  
Within the scope of this study, Westernization genesis of Turkish foreign policy 
is explained in the light of specific foreign issues at a specific time. The role of 
“geopolitical imagination” in the foundation and transformation of the concept of 
Westernization is examined as well. To do this, I aim to unearth the changes and 
circumstances emanated from the interaction of Westernization principle with 
contextual factors (domestic and international developments) appeared in the AKP era, 
since the dialectical relationship of the Westernization and contextual factors is 
considered as the main determinant of Turkey‟s foreign aid policy in the AKP era, as 
the hypothesis of the study suggests.  
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There are two important developments in the international arena that represents 
critical turning points with regard to Turkey‟s alignment with the West in the AKP era: 
the period after 9/11 attacks and Arab uprisings. Yet, while the West, as the genesis, 
constitutes the most influential part of foreign policy, it has evolved into a more 
instrumental existence from a conceptual one that is seen as a condition for 
modernization. In order to reveal the change in the concept of „Westernization‟ in 
foreign policy, it is crucial to present a historical overview where the concept itself has 
its roots.   
Westernization: Ottoman Legacy? 
Relations with the West has always been present in Turkish history though with 
different characterizations: first, as in foe and friend relationship, then as an integral 
part, later as an imitator, and in the end as a follower and ally (Aydın, 1999, p. 160). 
Ottoman Empire controlled one-third of Europe for four hundred years by alone. Thus, 
ignoring the Western effects on the Empire would be a great mistake. In this regard, 
embracing a somewhat secular system in foreign affairs could be considered as a 
reflection of this interaction between Western powers and the Ottoman Empire. 
Modernization process of the Ottoman Empire was also under heavy influence of the 
Western powers. In this respect, it can be argued that having a western-oriented and 
secular state approach of newly established Republic of Turkey was not in conflict with 
the former experience of the Turkish people (Aydın, 2005, pp. 12-13). Both Ottoman 
and Turkish modernizers believed that “there is no second civilization; civilization 
means  European  civilization,  and  it  must  be imported  with  both  its  roses  and 
thorns”, as Abdullah Cevdet states (cited in Aydın, 2004, p. 161). Most of the reforms 
introduced by the late Ottoman intellectuals were then implemented under Atatürk‟s 
leadership in the period between 1920 and 1930s. His success rooted in his eagerness to 
acknowledge European civilization with “both its roses and thorns”, argues Aydın, 
whereas the Ottoman reforms could only succeeded to imitate them with limited success 
(p. 161).  
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Early Republican Era  
Foreign policy approach in the early Republican era differed from the past in certain 
aspects. First of all, elimination of the religious sentiments from the public sphere was 
the main element in the foundation of the new Republic. Instead of religious sentiments, 
nationhood became the cement of statehood as with other secular Western principles 
(Bozdağlıoğlu, 2008, pp. 60-61), and republicanism, secularism and nationalism were 
embraced as the main political principles in the early Republican Era (Aydın, 2004, p. 
171) As it is argued above, Westernization is identified as a route for modernization in 
this period. Atatürk points that “there are many nations, but there is only one 
civilization. For the advancement of a nation, it must be a part of this one civilization … 
We wish to modernize our country.  All of  our efforts  are directed  toward  the  
establishment  of  a  modern,  therefore  Western, government.” (Aydın, 2004, p. 175) 
Intellectuals of the period, who were mostly educated in Western countries, constituted 
the engine of Turkish modernization process. They were aiming to re-structure the 
country in line with the Western system. When they encountered domestic challenges in 
this re-structuring process, they preferred to follow a top-down reform process through 
using the state power and changing the law (Oran, 2011, p. 52). 
In line with the aim of guaranteeing Western principles at home and completing 
the modernization process, Turkey followed a Western-oriented foreign policy while 
refusing to approach the East. Atatürk believed that in order to develop a peaceful 
foreign policy, there was a need to accomplish in-depth domestic reforms. It was also 
obvious in his statement that “what particularly interests foreign policy and upon which 
it is founded is the internal organization of the state. It is necessary that foreign policy 
should agree with the internal organization.” Therefore, domestic reform agenda and 
foreign policy goals were coordinated in this era. The most well-known motto of him 
“peace at home, peace in the world” is another reflection of this perspective. This 
approach does not only define foreign policy as an expansion of domestic politics, but 
also it determines the edges of foreign policy making. In this regard, any sort of foreign 
policy strategies that may endanger the principles of the Republican foundations; 
republicanism, secularism and nationalism were abandoned.  
From the security perspective, it can be argued that Turkey‟s first goal was to 
follow an independent domestic politics via thwarting the foreign intervention. Oğuzlu 
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and Kibaroğlu (2009) enlighten the motivation behind this security approach in Turkish 
foreign policy formulation by referring the concept of “logic of fear”. According to 
them, making western oriented reforms and cooperating with western security 
organization were seen as the only way to prevent any possible threats and interference 
to domestic politics by the Western powers (p. 579). From the point of this formulation, 
Turkey seems to be place itself near by the foe, Western states, rather than separating 
itself. To that end, becoming a member of the League of Nations was seen as 
strategically important since the way this alliance kept Turkey away from conflicts. 
Fuller (2008) also calls the Kemalist ideology‟s view to this fear as “paranoia” and 
states that: 
“While the republic did face genuine external enemies, Kemalist ideology 
tended to incorporate a fear of external powers and conspiracies as a key 
element in its world outlook. This paranoia toward the outside world helped 
both to preserve Turkey‟s domestic power and to justify an authoritarian 
approach to guarding the nation against external threats.” (p. 29) 
With the aim of empowering internal structure in the face of an „external threat‟, 
Turkish people were educated and socialized via the indoctrination process which is in 
line with the western ideals (Jenkins, 2001, pp. 16-18). 
When Ġsmet Ġnönü took over the presidency after the death of Atatürk, he 
followed the Kemalist ideology in foreign policy (Aydın, 2004, p. 29). In the period of 
WWII, neutrality as the main foreign policy formulation was consolidated. Millman 
(1995) identifies Turkey‟s main aims for the war period as; 
“keeping the alliance and cooperation with Russia in order to have secure 
borders in the East and the Black Sea,  to  ensure  common  action  of  
Balkans  in  case  of  any  external  threat,  as  in  the example of the Balkan 
Entente, and lastly the rapprochement with the West with the aim of 
providing security  against the Italian and German threats, and to 
guarantee security in his South borders with Iraq and Syria” (pp. 487-490).  
Overall, Turkey followed a realist foreign policy approach which totally aligned 
with the Western system. To this end, Turkey harmonized its domestic and 
sociopolitical structure with the Western civilization. Accordingly, foreign policy of the 
new Republic appeared with the aim of preserving status quo with a high level of 
commitment to the Western orientation.  
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Cold-War Period  
After the end of the WWII, the US and the Soviet Russia got on the stage as the main 
powers of the international system, yet with different ideological structures. The 
international structure turned into a bipolar system from balance of power. In this 
environment, Turkey again took its position with the Western Block. Being a member to 
the OECD (1948), the Council of Europe (1949), NATO (1952), and an associate 
membership of EEC (1963) were all regarded as a sign of Turkey‟s Western oriented 
foreign policy. In this period, the relationship between the US and Turkey was 
underpinned by the US‟ interests in the Middle East against the Soviet threat over the 
region. The US needed an ally in the Middle East and Turkey came to the fore along 
with Israel to fulfill this role (TaĢpınar, 2003, p. 11). In 1980s, bilateral relations 
between the US and Turkey were strengthened through many agreements and 
partnerships such as the Bilateral Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement or 
Enhanced Partnership (Isyar, 2005, pp. 31-33). With regard to the Cold War years, 
Mufti (1998) argues that this period was the years that signed “Westernization of 
Turkey‟s international relations.” (p. 41) 
Along with the close relations with the US, Turkey‟s membership process to the 
EU is noteworthy for analyzing the Westernization of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey‟s 
alignment with Europe in its foreign policy has become an inseparable part of the 
modernization process that aims to put Turkey into the European state system (Tağma, 
2010, pp. 376-377). Turkey began its journey to be a member of EEC through signing 
of the Ankara Association Agreement in 1963. During the Özal government, in 1987, 
Turkey applied for full membership to European Community (EC). Yet, this application 
was refused by the EC with a reason that Turkey was not ready to fulfill obligations of 
membership (Tocci, 2011, p. 49). In the last 50 years, this prospect for Turkey has 
turned into a concrete target of this journey and Turkey has decisively stuck to this 
target.  
Under the conditions of the Cold War international structure, realist foreign 
policy choice became inevitable for Turkey, which pointed to the “politics of balancing 
the near threat by means of collaborating with the rising axis” (Davutoğlu, 2001, p. 71). 
Taking advantage from the dispute among the European powers was no more option for 
Turkey. In addition, in terms of economic, military, and technological capacity, Turkey 
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was not powerful enough to maintain its neutrality. And, the Soviet threat to territorial 
and security interests was of top priority for Turkey (Hale, 2000, pp. 109-110). 
While the Cold War period reinforced the position of Turkey in the Western 
Bloc, it also caused the deterioration of relations with the Middle East. Most of the Arab 
states established alliances among themselves with the idea of balance of power in the 
absence of any guarantee for their security. Under these circumstances, Turkey was 
seen as in the opposite bloc, which followed Western rules and served their interests, 
though the highest proportion of its population is Muslim (Fuller, p. 39). 
When all these contextual factors of the Cold War are considered, it can be 
argued that Turkey could only follow a pre-determined strategy for its survival instead 
of conducting an independent strategy corresponded to its geo-strategic position. For 
Davutoğlu, “policy makers  received  this  preference  as  a  static paradigm” which 
prevented Turkey to develop alternative paradigms and to use its “natural  spheres  of 
influence” and alternative  power  centers (p. 71). The traditional foreign policy was not 
transformed into new strategies and the major goals remained the same at that period. 
The post-Cold War Era 
Dissolving of the bipolar power structure was the major source for this change in 
foreign policy. With the emancipation of international politics from black and white 
way of thinking of the Cold War, new alternatives emerged for Turkey through 
historical and cultural ties with other states in its surrounding region. AltunıĢık (2009) 
explains this necessity of creating new alternatives as follows:   
“The end of the Cold War with its new sources of uncertainties and also 
opportunities challenged the traditional paradigm of Turkish foreign policy 
and led to the surfacing of strong alternative viewpoints. The emergence of 
new possible areas of influence around Turkey also led to the re-emergence 
of a historical/cultural dimension in Turkish foreign policy and freed the 
country from the shackles of the Cold War. Thus, the changes in the 
international system provided a context for rethinking foreign policy.” (pp. 
172-176).  
For instance, this view of new alternatives reflects itself in Turkey‟s foreign 
policy towards Turkic states during Özal government. In this period, several trade 
agreements were signed and high level visits were conducted in an increasing trend in 
contrast to previous periods. Yet, these efforts were only able to play a limited role due 
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to political and economic weaknesses. In addition to domestic context, being at the 
center of one of the most vulnerable regions of the world put a burden in developing 
new alternatives in Turkish foreign policy. Thus, Turkey kept its alignment with the 
West in the post-Cold War era. NATO remained as the major organization that connects 
Turkey with the Western security system (Hale, 2000, p. 192). Similar to the Cold War 
years, Turkey and the US came to an agreement on wide range of issues in the post-
Cold War period. Turkey fully supported the UN resolutions against the Saddam regime 
in the First Gulf War. Besides, Turkey and the US agreed on liberation of Kuwait, 
lowering Russian impact on the Caucasus, Turkey‟s membership to the EU, Turkey‟s 
assigned role as a corridor for the Caspian and Central Asian energy resources, taking a 
cautious stance towards regional policies of Iran and Syria, the Balkans and IMF 
assistance to Turkey, and finally cooperation with Israel (Park, 2004, p. 495). 
In this period, the progress has been made in Turkey‟s relations with the EU as 
well. The Customs Union was completed between Turkey and the EU in 1995. 
However, the European Council refused to give candidate status to Turkey for the next 
enlargement due to some domestic and international problems that Turkey encountered. 
Prior to this decision, conflict between the Turkish military and the PKK had escalated. 
In addition, the conflict between Turkey and Greece over Kardak Islands in the Aegean 
Sea had appeared in 1996 and problems on Cyprus issue were not resolved (European 
Commission, 1998). Conflict over Cyprus between Turkey and Greece has played an 
important role in the relations between Turkey and the EU. On the one hand, Turkey‟s 
EU membership process has been halted many times due to Cyprus issue; on the other 
hand, the EU played an important role in ameliorating Turkey‟s relations with Greece 
(European Council, 1996). In this respect, it can be argued that the EU as a third party 
came into play through drawing a route for the solution of problems between Turkey 
and Greece by taking a positive interventionist stance.  
At the Helsinki Summit of 1999, European Council gave candidate status to 
Turkey. With this declaration, Turkey has started to fulfill pre-accession criteria in order 
to be ready for the EU membership. These criteria which are known as the Copenhagen 
criteria comprise guaranteeing stability of the institutions, consolidating democracy, 
ensuring freedom of expression, respect for human rights, and having efficiently 
functioning market economy. Copenhagen criteria also includes freedom of expression 
on the use of one‟s mother language, elimination of human rights violations such as 
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torturing and having developed peaceful solutions with the aim of overcoming problems 
with neighbors (Sakallıoğlu, 2003, p. 223). Therefore, in the light of these developments 
the agenda of Turkey in the end of 1990s and early 2000s was occupied with the 
reforms efforts to become a part of the West that had been Turkey‟s utmost priority for 
the last 50 years.  
As is seen in the historical background of Turkish foreign policy, West has a 
prominent role in Turkey‟s definition of itself in the international arena during the late 
Ottoman period and early Republican era as being a reference for modernization. Yet, 
through the major changes in international structure such as WWII, the Cold War and 
its aftermath, the reference point of West has also evolved. In the present time, while 
the relations with the US and the EU are still determinants in Turkey‟s foreign policy 
formation, the West no longer constitutes a reference point for modernization. In the 
AKP era, with the changes and developments in domestic politics as well as the 
international developments such as 9/11 and the Arab Spring Turkey emerged as an 
important actor that have a say in the events occurred at the global arena rather than 
only being a „follower‟. Specifically, the years following the 9/11 events and Arab 
Uprisings come to the forefront as critical circumstances that reveal the genesis of West 
in Turkish foreign policy.  In this sense, the evolution of the West has also been shaping 
through the domestic developments in the AKP era, namely political stability and 
democratization process; economic growth; and ideational structuring in foreign policy 
vision. As the hypothesis of this study suggests that those contextual factors have 
dialectical impact on each other so that understanding the domestic dynamics becomes 
inevitable for this study. To that end, next section presents major domestic 
developments in Turkey during the AKP era.  
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PART III: TURKEY UNDER THE AKP ERA  
Political Stability and Democratization Process in the AKP era 
Turkish political life has dramatically changed with the general election in 2002 on 
which AKP came to power. A single-party government with a parliamentary majority 
has brought relative political stability after the turbulent and chaotic years of 1990s. 
Due to this development, AKP government has managed to break the deadlock of 
previous coalition governments to some extent. In every field of Turkish politics, from 
public policy to foreign policy, this change has come up with its results. Through the 
strong support enjoyed by the AKP at the domestic level, government could transform 
its own priorities on the foreign policy arena into concrete policies. Along with the 
political stability, democratization process in the AKP era has turned into a 
supplementary element of government‟s regional policies. While political stability and 
single majority government has turned Turkey into a more consistent actor with regard 
of its foreign policy implications, improvement in Turkey‟s democratization has raised 
Turkey‟s international reputation and contributed its mission as being one of the most 
democratic and stable country within its surrounding region.   
Since 2002 elections, AKP has won successive elections, both in local and 
national level. Hereby, AKP government has stamped its own vision to both domestic 
and foreign policy of Turkey in last twelve years, so far. Although priorities or attitudes 
of AKP government have varied across different time periods between elections, it has 
succeeded to maintain its domination on Turkish politics. With the victory of national 
elections in 2011, AKP became the first party in Turkish political history which 
increased its share of total votes for three consecutive elections (Baç & Keyman, 2012, 
p. 85). Yet, March 2014 local elections were held in a very turbulent atmosphere. There 
were corruption allegations related to the AKP, many demonstrations and civil unrest 
against the AKP regime, which is called as the Gezi Protests and excessive use of force 
by the police against the protestors.  
Instead of quelling the continuance of the uprisings, AKP government took a 
tougher line that escalated the tension among society. Due to this mismanagement and 
undemocratic attitude of the government, political stability in Turkey has been deeply 
shaken. Following these events, AKP government started to get many critics from 
26 
  
different parts of the society. One of the most important reasons behind the AKP 
success and its ability to maintain stability has been its wide-ranging popular support. 
And it seemed that it would lose this support and reputation in the eyes of the people. 
Yet, those critics did not prevent the victory of AKP government in local elections of 
2014 which the party obtained 45.6% of total votes. Although the main opposition party 
increased its vote-share, candidates for mayor of AKP were re-elected in most of the 
cities in Turkey. However, Turkish politics has entered a very fragile and volatile 
period, which of consequences for Turkish politics will be clearly observed in the 
following years.  
In this environment, Turkish Presidential Election of 2014 appeared as a test for 
AKP government since President of Turkish Republic was elected through national 
election for the first time in history. Thanks to this election, ex-chairman of the AKP 
and previous Prime Minister of Turkey since 2003, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, became the 
President of Turkish Republic.  This electoral success, once again, showed that in the 
eyes of majority of Turkish constituents, AKP government and its prominent leader still 
is the best viable alternative for ruling the country. Although there are many critics with 
regard to authoritarian measurements of AKP government, the political stability 
obtained through AKP‟s electoral success from 2002 is likely to remain in the near 
future.  
Along with the electoral success and political stability, the AKP era has also 
been referred with the democratization process in Turkish political history. Since 2002, 
AKP government has put into practice many political reforms on democracy. Turkish 
government has started accession negotiations with the EU, implemented a number of 
political reform packages, re-figured civil military relations, conducted „democratic 
opening‟ process to Kurdish minority, and tried to improve dialogue between Turkey 
and Armenia. 
According to ÖniĢ (2013), the AKP government, specifically in its early phase, 
has taken important steps that consolidated Turkish democracy. The EU and the 
following Europeanization process have constituted a main motivation of 
democratization process. In the light of these developments, new image of Turkey 
appeared and altered the “old Turkey” which is based on the Kemalist Establishment (p. 
105). In this regard, the most prominent change is the decline of military power in 
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Turkish politics since the military tutelage was seen as the main impediment towards 
democratic consolidation (Sakallıoğlu, 2007, pp. 151-166). In this period, civilian 
politicians have become more powerful than military elites in Turkish politics. Hereby, 
military has receded from the center of Turkish politics to the periphery. This 
progressive development was also welcome by foreign politicians and scholars. Along 
with the improvement of civil-military relations, the dominance of the traditional 
Kemalist bureaucracy, specifically in the judiciary and foreign affairs has been declined 
(ÖniĢ, 2013, p. 105). 
In terms of its ability of encompassing different religious groups and ethnic 
identities, the AKP is seen as more democratic from previous governments. In this era, 
many reforms have been performed with the aim of recognizing minority rights to some 
extent. Especially, in terms of cultural and language rights of the Kurdish citizens, 
important steps have been taken. Yet, there is still remaining problem in turning those 
rights to the actual practices (ÖniĢ, pp. 105-106). In a similar vein, conservative and 
religious parts of Turkish society have gained greater recognition with the AKP 
government. This recognition has also reflected in the economic area. The rise of 
conservative Anatolian business elites has decreased the dominance of secular business 
elites. Overall, more pluralistic atmosphere in politics and economy preponderated in 
Turkey. Hereby, the main problems, which are seen as democratic deficits, of previous 
governments have been trying to be overcome in the AKP era (p. 106).  
The Constitutional referendum in September 2012 was another significant step 
that aimed to put an end the authoritarian legacies of the 1980 constitution which was 
made by the military elites.  This new process of constitution making, thus, has been 
seen as a sine qua non of further democratization of Turkish politics. Although there 
were huge critics pointing that the AKP government was trying to consolidate its own 
power instead of democracy, the referendum was approved. Major issues of the 
constitutional agenda has been developing a new approach to the concept of citizenship, 
improving political equality among Turkish citizens, guaranteeing the freedom of 
speech, and strengthening the system of checks and balances. Management of this 
process is also valued because of its way of setting a good example for the Middle 
Eastern states.  In this process, civic engagement in political life has also been 
strengthened. Many civil society groups have been included to constitution making 
process. The AKP government is aware of the necessity to develop a wider consensus 
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among diverse groups on constitutional change (Baç & Keyman, 2012, pp. 85-86). 
These changes have all contributed to the democratization process in Turkey.  
Unfortunately, these developments were interrupted and then, constitutional 
making process has been totally halted in a similar way of other democratization 
reforms. The AKP government failed to successfully finalize this process. Moreover, 
instead of taking further steps towards democratization, the AKP government has 
preferred to take more authoritarian measures that restrain freedom of Turkish citizens 
in recent years. Rather than maintaining more inclusive and encompassing political 
atmosphere, the ruling party discourse have evolved to a more exclusionist way. In a 
nutshell, the AKP government has not succeeded to accompany its electoral 
accomplishments with democratic political accomplishments so far (Baç & Keyman, 
2012). Yet, it should not be underestimated that the political stability that the AKP 
government brought to Turkish politics, especially until 2009, has underpinned the 
general structure of today‟s Turkey.  
Political stability and democratic development in Turkish politics have also 
constituted main determinants of Turkish foreign policy change in the AKP era. First of 
all, Turkey‟s reputation in international arena has increased with regard to these 
developments. With respect to Turkey‟s political, cultural, and religious affinities with 
neighboring countries, Turkey‟s democratization process with a high level of political 
stability has been served as a model for those countries. Turkish government has been 
aware of the necessity that Turkey cannot become a regional power unless it becomes a 
true liberal democracy. For instance, in order to uphold the “Turkish model” in the 
Middle East, Turkey should ensure democratic rights at home first, including freedom 
of speech and press, minority rights etc. In this regard, Turkey needs to maintain its 
relationship with the EU which is one of the anchors of liberal democracy. Without 
ensuring equal rights to all its citizens, Turkey cannot promulgate itself as a model in 
the Middle East with full support from Western allies (Çağatay, 2014) In this regard, 
Turkey‟s strengthened stance in global politics has constituted the basis of one of the 
main Turkish foreign policy goals: being a central country. Through becoming more 
powerful in its domestic politics, Turkey has improved its regional policies while 
promoting its reputation and reinforcing its role in international arena. Yet, it would be 
misleading to ignore the effect of economic growth to Turkish foreign policy goals in 
the AKP era. Without having a strong economy, the goal of being a central country 
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would not be realized. Thus, it should also be noted that all domestic developments, 
argued above, and economic growth have mutually reinforcing power on themselves. 
Therefore, the next section explains the way Turkish economy grows with regard to 
those developments.  
Turkish Economic Growth in the AKP era 
Along with the political stability, Turkish economy has progressed under the AKP 
government. While many countries has shaken with the Eurozone financial crisis and 
Arab uprisings, Turkey has turned into a country which is more attractive for Western 
and other financial investors thanks to its relative political stability. Moreover, Turkey 
has also been more appealing through diversifying its trade partners, approaching new 
markets, and raising its Islamic capital (Çağatay, 2014).  
At the end of the 1990s, Turkey had been struggling with Turkish lira 
depreciation, the lack of confidence in foreign exchange deposits, balance deficit, and 
the lack of transparency in the asset and liability balance of banks (Transition to Strong 
Economy Program, 2001). To overcome those problems, the Disinflation Program was 
entered into force under supervision of the IMF in 2000, as a first step. Yet, these 
measures fell short of preventing the eruption of 2001 crisis. Being deadly affected by 
the crisis, Turkish government realized that unless fiscal and monetary policy programs 
put into force, macroeconomic stability is far from likely to be achieved at that moment 
(Yendi et al, 2012, p. 51). 
On call of coalition government in rule at that time, the Transition to the Strong 
Economy Program of IMF was put into force after the 2001 crisis. The main objective 
of the program was to fight with high inflation, to re-arrange the public financing 
balance, and to re-figure the financial sector. Most of these measures lied behind the 
relatively stable structure of Turkish economy after 2001 crisis (Transition to Strong 
Economy Program, 2001).   
AKP‟s emergence as a winner of the 2002 election came out of that environment 
in which public opinion was questioning the quality and sustainability of economic 
policies of previous governments. Economic policy of the AKP was essentially aligned 
with the IMF stabilization program, specifically in the first period of its ruling. In line 
with the program, the AKP government took several steps on fiscal discipline, central 
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bank independence, implicit inflation targeting, and extensive structural reforms (Uğur, 
2008, p. 6). After successfully implementation of the Program, Turkey faced a process 
of rapid economic growth. The period between 2002 and 2007, the economic growth 
was reached 6.8% while its average was 3% in between 1992 and 2001. Similar change 
was observed in the inflation rate. It dropped to a 17.6% from 70% annual rate in 
between 2002 and 2007 (IMF, 2014). The fiscal discipline of the Program was the main 
factor behind this economic change. Yet, the increase in the level of unemployment 
could not be effectively controlled due to the privatization programs, the fiscal 
adjustment and the tight monetary policy where it reached above 10% in this period 
(Yendi, p. 52).  
Another important issue in economy was the increase in the current account 
deficits at that period. As a result of tighter monetary policy and higher inflation rate 
relative to other developed countries, trade deficit was occurred in relation with the Lira 
depreciation. Those challenges before the export capacity of Turkey signaled the need 
of structural reforms for strengthening the competitiveness of domestic industries in 
Turkey. However, it would not be wrong to argue that the general outlook of economy 
was in a good shape in the first period of the AKP rule. This was also confirmed at a 
time of the 2007 global crisis. Turkey was one of the countries that slightly affected by 
the crisis. Thanks to the reforms made in the banking sector and financial markets after 
the 2001 crisis, Turkey could rapidly overcome bad effects of 2007 crisis. GDP rate was 
stabilized around 9% while the level of export was brought into normal levels after the 
years of recession. Thanks to these developments, two rating agencies upgraded 
Turkey's debt to investment grade in 2012 and 2013 (CIA Factbook). According to 
Rodrik (2009), Turkish case appeared as an important lesson for other countries during 
the crisis period. Although it is generally believed that economic policies of 
governments would become useless in the lack of development of financial markets, 
reforms of the monetary and fiscal policies could protect Turkey‟s economy from both 
domestic and external shocks.  
It is important to note that there are two indicators that signed structural 
vulnerabilities of economic systems. These are increasing current account deficits and 
declining saving rates. While the ratio of current account deficit to GNP increased from 
less than 1% in 2002 to 7.3% in 2007, the national saving rate as a proportion of GDP 
dropped to 16.0 in 2006 from 21% in 2002. Both of these indicators pointed out the 
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reliance of Turkey on external finance. Thus, they showed that Turkey is extremely 
vulnerable to changes in external financial market (IMF, 2007). 
Decline of the current account and saving rates are also linked to structural 
features of Turkish economy such as high level of import of Turkish manufacturing, 
high level of income inequality, and level of GDP per capita. Yet, government policies 
have had an effect too. Since the inflation rate had been declined at the cost of high real 
interest rates, Turkish Lira has been over-valued and the current account has been 
deteriorated. However, at a time when the AKP government has started to follow its 
own economic policy by slightly differing from IMF program, Turkey has faced high 
real interest rates which have been accompanied by an increasing in the inflation rates. 
As a result, the costs of investment and disinflation have increased (Uğur, p. 6). 
However, despite these limitations of Turkish economy, it should be noted that 
AKP government had two main contributions. First, AKP government followed the 
stabilization program and structural reform agenda of the IMF and the World Bank. By 
doing so, the AKP could manage stabilization and reform process. In the lack of AKP 
leadership, these processes may have been failed to achieve. Second contribution of the 
AKP government was its commitment to the EU membership process. In this regard, 
numerous democratization reforms have been realized. From a period between 2002 and 
2004, Turkey succeeded to fulfill requirements for the beginning of EU accession 
negotiations in 2005. Since balance between the economic growth and political stability 
was seen as the most significant factor of Turkey‟s EU membership, AKP government‟s 
commitment to the EU membership played an important role as a basis of credibility for 
the economic policy structure (Uğur, pp. 6-7). 
When all these accomplishments are considered, it can be argued that Turkish 
economy under the AKP rule has become one of the success stories of economic 
development in the last decade when the world seems to suffer from decreased 
economic activity. When the G-20 was organized in 2003, Turkey  found  itself  among  
key international players as the largest 15th economy in the world; and Turkish policy 
makers aim to make Turkey as one of  the  largest  10  economies  in  the  world  by  
2023. In addition to the challenge, some experts argue that Turkey may encounter the 
„middle income trap‟ and difficulty on this determined route with the similar 
momentum as it has been going through the past decade. Yet, despite of those 
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challenges, Turkey seems nearer its long-lasting dream than ever before. It has already 
managed to join the “trillion dollar – plus” economies of Europe, including France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain (Çağatay, 2013, 800). This exceptional growth 
in Turkish economic has strengthened its increasing international profile as well. Just a 
decade before, average income of Turkish citizens had one-fifth of Europeans. Now, 
Turkey has become a country in which citizens are only 30% less wealthy than 
Europeans. Moreover, Turks‟ purchasing power has increased much more than some 
EU member states, such as Bulgaria, Romania, and Latvia (p. 801). 
These major reforms and developments in economic realm have significantly 
affected Turkish foreign policy strategy. In order to strengthen its soft-power and 
increasing its pro-active foreign policy activities, high level of economic capacity seems 
inevitable end to Turkey (Kutlay & ÖniĢ, 2013, p. 19). Under these economic 
circumstances, Turkey seems that it could make real its 400-year old dream of 
becoming Western by catching up with the West. Turkey‟s combining its ongoing links 
with European economies to other states of Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) can be also seen as the main motivation of its emergence as 
an economic power in global economic order. To put in a different way, Turkey has 
managed to remain open to European market and investors while aiming to be attached 
with emerging markets, specifically with Muslim-majority countries. This combination 
in economy has generated remarkable results for Turkish economy. While, in 2007, 
Turkey‟s trade with Europe was 56%, this figure has dropped to 42% in 2013. Yet, this 
gap in trade volume has filled with the rise of trade with the Middle Eastern and North 
African countries. While trade with those countries was 13% in 2002, now it has 
increased to 26%. In a similar vein, Turkey‟s trade with sub-Saharan Africa has reached 
to $17 billion in 2013 (Çağatay, p. 801). 
This diversification in Turkish economy in the AKP era reveals that Turkish 
economic activities have been aligned with the Turkish foreign policy transformation. 
Emphasis on being a global country and multi-faceted foreign approach as the 
determinants of Turkish foreign policy reflect itself Turkey‟s economic relations in 
international arena. Turkey could take advantage of its proximity to Europe and its 
affinity with Muslim countries. Turkey succeeded to engage in trade and economic 
agreements with Iran, Iraq, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and Syria. In 2010, 
the trade volume between Turkey and Iran reached its peak with $10.6 billion. Also, 
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Iran became Turkey‟s second largest energy supplier after Russia (MFA). Along with 
Iran, economic relations with Syria and Northern Iraq rapidly increased. As a result of 
border trade in southeast Turkey, local economy of this area has been positively 
influenced. Through bilateral agreements between Syria and Turkey, such as free trade 
agreement, mutual abolishment of the visas, trade relations were strengthened. As a 
result, the trade volume of these two country reached 2.2 billion $ in 2010, which is 
three times of the number in 2002 (MFA). 
Along with the alignment in foreign policy and Turkish economy, a decade of 
stability and democratization process under the AKP rule have contributed to Turkish 
economic growth. Thanks to the democratic reforms, as argued in the previous section, 
Turkey has been drawing attention of international and regional players. More 
importantly, Turkey has succeeded to improve its international image in the eyes of 
both Western and Eastern countries. In fact, this appearance of AKP government in 
international politics is not only limited to its political and economic developments of 
Turkey but also its newly established foreign policy vision and policies in its nearer and 
wider environment. To analyze this change in foreign policy, it is significant to 
scrutinize the theoretical foundations of the foreign policy formulation in the AKP era 
with regard to new tools and instruments initiated which are under the leadership of the 
then Minister for Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu. To that end, the next section presents an 
overview of the way perception of the West has evolved and new ideational structure is 
established.  
Turkish Foreign Policy in the AKP era  
Resurfacing the Idea of West: Geographic Imagination 
The concept of geopolitics plays an important role in understanding and analyzing 
Turkish foreign policy from past to today. Having considered geopolitical vision 
provides significant clues for elucidating the transformation of the concept of West in 
Turkish foreign policy under the AKP era. In order to analyze the impact of geopolitics, 
it is important to elucidate the concept of geographic imagination which identifies the 
conceptual map of political elites. By building this cognitive process, geographical 
imagination underlies the culture of geopolitics by entitling regions, such as the Middle 
East or by establishing mental zones, such as the East and the West. In this regard, 
geographic imagination appears as one of the most effective factors in figuring the 
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discourses and practices of policymakers and in determining attributions and 
categorizations. Mainly, these categorizations are socially constructed and under 
influence of historical experiences and interplays.  
Along with the categorizations, new geopolitical images of threat emerge as an 
important factor in shaping foreign policy preferences. Through this way, geographic 
imagination plays a significant role by redefining potential foes as potential friends or 
former conflict areas as potential zones of influence (Aras & Fidan, 2009, p. 196). Aras 
and Fidan‟s formulation of geographic imagination is the cognitive framework which 
identifies the way one perceives and describes his country‟s geopolitical conditions. It 
shows the underlying mechanism of how geopolitics is comprehended and interpreted. 
In this respect, Turkey seems to transform its international status by developing a new 
foreign policy approach. A main feature of this approach is to leave aside the negative 
connotations and biases belonged to Turkey‟s past.  
From the beginning of the new republic, Turkish foreign policy has been going 
through a critical transformation which has totally reflected itself also in geopolitical 
discourse of political elites. By only sticking to the physical location of the country, this 
perceptional change in the minds of political elites might be disregarded. As Aras and 
Fidan (2009) put it well “although the distances remain the same, the perception of … 
geographic regions has significantly changed through the lenses of a new geographic 
imagination.” (p. 199) Thus, the geographic imagination of foreign policy elites has 
become an integral part of understanding the developments of Turkish foreign policy.  
Turkey‟s geopolitical position in the world order has always been of significance 
for policy makers. Throughout the years, protectionism and exceptionalism have been 
two main concepts that constitute the traditional geopolitical vision of Turkish foreign 
policy. While the protectionism conduces to develop defensive foreign policy activities, 
the exceptionalism lays stress on territorial and geopolitical exceptionalism of Turkey 
which affects the emergence of political discourse that is shaped by “Turkey‟s territorial 
and civilizational anxiety in the regional and global geopolitical order.” (YeĢiltaĢ, 2013, 
p. 661) Moreover, the emphasis on exceptionalism and this anxious way of thinking 
have forced Turkish policy makers to follow isolationism in foreign policy, instead of 
multi-dimensional approaches. As Aras and Fidan (2009) argue that Turkey was 
approaching its neighborhood “as a geography of chaos and a source of instability” 
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which “resulted in Turkey‟s conscious alienation and limited involvement in the region” 
(p. 197).  
The roots of defensive geopolitical imagination of Turkish foreign policy goes 
back to nation-building process at Early Republican Era and resulted from 
“domesticating the nation-state territories, which created a sense of well-defined 
homeland in strict territorial terms.” (Aras, Dağcı, Çaman, 2009, p. 29) In this regard, it 
can be argued that the nation-state notion has constituted one of the most important 
foundations of Turkey‟s geopolitical culture. Yet, in the new geopolitical discourse of 
the AKP government, there is a change in the scope of this culture. Rather than 
“territorial and nationally defined location that is spatially fixed by its national 
boundaries”, wider cultural regions such as the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans, 
and North Africa has underpinned the basis of geopolitical culture of Turkey (YeĢiltaĢ, 
pp. 661-662). Aras (2009) explains this change in geopolitical imagination as follows: 
 “Davutoğlu‟s re-defining of Turkey‟s role in both neighboring regions and  
international  politics  changed  the  concept  of  „strategic  depth‟ and  
expanded the cognitive map in policymaker‟s minds beyond the borders of  
Turkey. The territorial limits to Turkish involvement in neighboring 
countries have disappeared in this new mindset. The relationship between 
„bordering and othering‟ lost its meaning after removing the strains of 
domestic threat perceptions in regional policy.” (p. 129) 
Through new geopolitical imagination, the edges of Turkish foreign policy are 
shaped through the non-territorial concepts such as order and civilization, unlike 
defensive geopolitics. Thus, the new geopolitical approach puts forward a different 
vision of Turkey‟s stance in international arena and shows a break from the geopolitical 
discourse of previous governments with regard to Turkey‟s place in international system 
and its attachment to Western political order (YeĢiltaĢ, p. 662).  
With the influence of new geographic imagination, the “West” has lost its 
meaning in Turkish politics as the only way through modern Turkey. Westernization 
has been no more regarded as a condition for modernization. Rather, this genesis has 
evolved into the concept referring to an international system that Turkey has become 
part of it. As Kalın (2011) argues, new geographic imagination is “a new idea of time 
and place [that] makes it possible for Turkey to produce its own concepts and build a 
new vocabulary.” According to him, this change in the “profound mental 
transformation” puts an end to perceive the world from a non-Eurocentric perspective 
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(pp. 6–7). Through these developments, foreign policy activities of Turkey has extended 
the range from “contributing to peace and stability in the Middle East, to playing an 
active role in countering terrorism and extremism, to become a new energy hub to 
acting as one of the architects of the inter-civilization dialogue initiative aiming at 
producing a vision of the world, based on dialogue, tolerance and living together.” 
(Keyman, 2009, p. 7) 
In this regard, Turkish foreign policy approach has shaped through more synthesis 
policies. In order to become a strong regional actor in its neighborhood regions, it is 
agreed that Turkey should follow its own interests and rights while determining its own 
powerful stance within the international system. As this new vision in foreign policy 
offers, instead of looking outside through the prisms of the West, Turkey should take 
advantage of its links with the West and follow a more instrumental approach in 
pursuing its interests. Thus, in this new era, Turkish foreign policy has come to the fore 
with its emphasis on more comprehensive and overarching stance in developing its 
foreign policy activities without rejecting the Europeanization project. In this vision, the 
EU or the West, in general, has no more put at the center of Turkey‟s external relations. 
Rather, it becomes one of the integral and important parts of Turkish foreign policy. 
This mental transformation in foreign policy has gradually manifested itself in 
Turkish foreign policy activities. Turkey has re-discovered that its neighborhood is not 
limited only with Europe. Rather than turning away from the West, Turkey has started 
to follow an active foreign policy towards several regions: the Middle East, the Balkans, 
the wider Black Sea regions, and the Central Asia. This new trend points out a break 
with previous foreign policy vision that Turkey as a country surrounded by enemies and 
strategically located in the West. Yet, this break does not indicate that the West has lost 
its importance in Turkish foreign policy. Rather, Turkey becomes aware of importance 
that having a more responsive foreign policy towards its surrounding regions would 
enhance its relations with the West while pursuing its own regional interests.  
This approach reflected itself in the relations with the West, especially with the 
US the EU in the AKP era. In this period, while Turkey further engaged with the West, 
it also has turned into an important player in its neighboring regions in the aftermath of 
9/11 events and more recently with the Arab Uprisings. In this regard, there has been a 
resurfacing of West in the AKP era in the light of 9/11 and Arab Uprisings yet as an 
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international system where Turkey is also a part of it rather being as the sole reference 
point for modernization. Therefore, before presenting the main characteristics of 
Turkish foreign policy in the AKP period, next section explains the concept of West in 
foreign policy through examining the relations with the US in the aftermath of 9/11 
events as well as with the EU in the 2000s and after the Arab Uprisings.  
Turkey and the US in the aftermath of 9/11 Events 
On  9/11,  2001,  United  States  was  shocked  by  a  series  of  coordinated terrorist  
attacks.  Besides the tragic death of hundreds of people, 9/11 attacks made serious 
impacts on the face and the course of international politics. 9/11 events have also 
generated new challenges to the US foreign policy. Maintaining the post-Cold War 
structure was no more option for states in the period between the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and 9/11 attacks (Davutoğlu, 2010). The new challenge appeared after the 9/11 events 
was mainly the question of what the new route of international system would be. In this 
period, US foreign policy makers encountered the problem of how to deal with the 
balance between liberty and security which they had believed that their country is free 
from the politically instable and insecure territories of the world thanks to continental 
location of the country (Davutoğlu, 2009, pp. 11-12). Thus, they have embarked on a 
quest of new foreign policy strategies in fighting against the global terrorism (Beris & 
Gürkan, 2002, p. 44).  
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Islamist terrorism was identified as the main 
enemy in global arena. The US hegemonic supremacy was challenged in the face of 
global terrorism. In this regard, the US split the world into two parts, friends who take 
sides with the US in fighting against terrorism and foes who do not (Keyman, 2009, p. 
14). At that period, Turkey took a side with the US and provided total support the US in 
fighting against global terror. Initially, the US initiated the war against terrorism in 
Afghanistan. In Afghanistan case, Turkey aligned with the UN resolution and took a 
responsive role within International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Turkey‟s 
alignment with the US, as a country that has both Western orientation and a Muslim 
population, enabled the US to argue that this war was not a crusade against Islam.  
With regard to second Gulf War, PKK issue appeared as a challenging element 
for Turkish-US relations. In combating the PKK problem, Turkey and the US took a 
common position and they both proclaimed the PKK as a common enemy. The US 
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provided support to Turkey in intelligence in return for Turkish cooperation in 
operations conducted in the Northern Iraqi territories (Aydın, 2009, pp. 137-139). Yet, 
the relationship between Turkey and the US  entered  into  a  difficult  period  due to  
Turkey‟s  Parliamentary refusal of 2003 to the US opening a northern front against 
Saddam regime in the  Second  Gulf  War (Erickson, 2004, p. 16). The US was 
approaching the Iraq War as an important step for re-establishing of the post-9/11 global 
and regional order. Çağatay (2004) puts forward two reasons for this refusal which are 
the lack of international legitimacy for the US intervention and the rise of anti-war and 
anti-US public discourse in the wide range society from religious parts to the leftist ones 
(pp. 46-47). However, despite of the clashing interest in bilateral relations with Turkey 
and the US, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) acknowledged to open the 
Turkish airspace to the US military forces and assisted the US logistic to Iraq through 
Turkey (TGNA, 2003, Decision No: 763).   
In order to ameliorate the deteriorated bilateral relations, Turkish Foreign 
Minister Abdullah Gül and the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared the 
Document of Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue in July 2006. With this 
declaration, the US and Turkey aimed to promote the relations in economic, scientific 
and technological fields. To consolidate bilateral cooperation, this document provided a 
roadmap for two countries. After the 9/11 events, Turkey‟s strategic importance in the 
Cold War circumstances began to be reconsidered (Oğuzlu, 2007, pp. 48-49). Turkey 
was in search of developing new foreign policy strategies in this newly established 
international system. In this environment, Turkey was pointed out as a role model for 
the Middle Eastern countries in several official explanations of the US Administrators.  
As a country which is the only democratic country had strong relations with the 
non-Muslim world, Turkey was assigned to fulfill this role. Besides Turkey‟s assigned 
role as a model country, inefficiency of the US in democratization process of the Middle 
Eastern countries reinforced Turkey‟s strategic position. On the contrary to the US 
strategies towards the Middle East, the post 9/11 era raised anti-Americanism while 
deteriorating the US legitimacy at the same time. The US led political instability and 
chaos provided an appropriate ground for Turkey in taking an active role in the region. 
In a similar vein, strategic environment occurred in the aftermath of the Iraq War of 
2003 made neighboring countries getting closer to Turkey. In this regard, Larrabee 
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(2007) points the US invasion to Iraq as a “major catalyst” for Turkey‟s Middle East 
policy and its rapprochement with Iran and Syria.  
As is seen, while Turkey consolidated its alignment with the US in the region, it 
also increased its engagement with the neighboring countries. Therefore, for the first 
time in the history of Turkish foreign policy, Turkey‟s approach towards the West and 
the East was not torn in conflicting policies; rather, they were mutually reinforcing. 
Overall, it can be argued that although some vision-based disagreements may occur 
time to time between Turkey and the US, a common position to sustain the alliance 
continues. In the international structure shaped through 9/11 events, the alliance 
between US and Turkey has become more valuable in fight against global terrorism 
with regard to interests of both countries. 
Implications of EU Membership Process and the Arab Uprisings  
At the European Council Summit of 2004, European Council decided to start accession 
negotiations with Turkey in 2005. Since then, Turkey‟s reform agenda shaped through 
the EU accession process put its stamp on Turkey‟s domestic vision which has also 
underpinned the regeneration of the Turkish foreign policy formulation. Since the 
modernization process of Turkey has been going hand in hand with the domestic reform 
agenda, a bid for membership in the EU has become one of the most important Turkish 
foreign policy goals.  
In the AKP government, EU membership process has remained as one of the 
priorities in Turkish foreign policy as well. As Davutoğlu underlines that becoming a 
member of the EU is not an ordinary foreign policy goal for Turkey. Rather, it is a 
comprehensive domestic political, social, and economic reform packages and an effort 
for realigning with international conditions (MFA, 2009). In this regard, Turkish law 
has entered into transformation process through several adjustments packages and 
constitutional changes with the aim of improving and consolidating Turkish democracy 
in order to comply with Copenhagen criteria. To that end, many amendments in Turkish 
law has been made; such as changes in the Civil Code that enlarge gender equality and 
changes in Penal Code that eliminate the death penalty, torture and ill-treatment, 
amendments of the Anti-Terror Law that allow broadcasting in languages other than 
Turkish and regulation of crimes against the indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic, 
40 
  
several adjustments regarding the role of military in politics through the National 
Security Council, and abolishment of the State Security Courts (Baç, 2005, pp. 16-30). 
Along with the end of the Cold War and 9/11 events, which are defined as 
“tectonic shifts in the international order” by Aras (2013, p. 3), the Arab Spring was 
another major shift that Turkey has accordingly re-arranged its foreign policy. Similar 
to the critical changes of the end of the Cold War and 9/11 events, the Western 
orientation again reflected itself in Turkish foreign policy activities (p. 3). The Arab 
Spring provided a great opportunity for Turkey and the EU in laying emphasis on the 
value of cooperation between Turkey and the EU over the Middle East. On the one 
hand, Turkey‟s new geographic imagination presents strategic importance for the EU in 
enlarging its sphere of influence through Turkey‟s connections with new political elites 
in the region. The EU, on the other hand, has a great capacity to provide political and 
social agenda for the transformation of the countries in the region and strong 
connections with civil society groups. When those factors come together, EU-Turkey 
cooperation becomes more important not only for the Arab Spring but also their 
sustainable and effective regional policies. In this respect, Turkey realized the difficulty 
of distancing itself from the West while the EU discovered the importance of Turkey‟s 
support in the region (Aras, 2013, pp. 4-5).  
According to Aras, the Arab Spring was an opportunity to retrieve Western 
values through elimination of repressive ruling of authoritarian regimes in the region (p. 
4). Main motivation behind political uprisings were to establish a new balance in the 
region through replacing authoritarian regimes with the outward-looking ones which are 
in search for fundamental Western values such as liberty, freedom and good 
governance. In this regard, the Arab Spring has also appeared as a test for ethical 
dimension of emerging international system. As a response, the rising powers of the 
international system have preferred to follow isolationist or non-interventionist policies 
towards the Arab Spring (p. 3).  
On the contrary to rising powers, such as China, Russia, India, and Brazil, 
Turkey followed an assertive policy and took part in the transformation in the region 
(Aras, p. 4). Since the intended regime transformation aimed to put democratic regimes 
into power instead of autocratic ones, Turkey‟s regional policy put an emphasis on 
democratic principles and Western values through embracing democracy promotion 
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agenda of those countries (KardaĢ, 2011, p. 1) Turkey‟s role in regional transformation 
mainly took two forms. First, Turkey tried to get in contact with groups that aim to take 
place in new political structures in the countries where regime change was trying to be 
realized in a peaceful way. Second, Turkey took side with the popular opposition and 
supported their demand for political reforms in the countries where the regime change 
was going through a violent phase. Although Turkey‟s reactions to the Arab Spring has 
come in for criticism due to its timing, Turkey‟s regional policy on the period of the 
Arab Spring showed its pro-democracy stance and its commitment to the normative 
principles of the international order. In this regard, the Arab Spring once again revealed 
that Turkey is entrenched in the Western order (p. 2). Moreover, as KardaĢ (2012) 
argues that Turkish foreign policy towards the Arab Spring “underscored not only 
Turkey‟s similarity to Western values but also its dissimilarity from potential 
contenders to the global order.” (p. 4) Overall, it can be argued that, on the issue of the 
Arab Spring, Western genesis of Turkish foreign policy has reflected itself as a 
Turkey‟s commitment to democratic and normative principles, and international norms. 
When the critical points in relations with the West, such as 9/11 and Arab 
Spring, are taken into account, it is seen that the policy alignment with the West in the 
AKP era continues yet with a considerable difference: the West is no longer seen as an 
end as in the period prior to AKP governance, rather it has become a means in the 
process of becoming a strong international player. The most evident reflection of this 
change is seen in the new foreign policy tools and instruments of AKP government, 
specifically in foreign aid policy which are explained in the following parts of this 
section.  
Ideational Structuring in the AKP Era 
Turkey as a Central Country  
Strategic Depth Doctrine constitutes the ideational basis of Turkish foreign policy, 
which is developed by Davutoğlu. He is the intellectual architect of the AKP foreign 
policy. Strategic Depth Doctrine is mainly based on Davutoğlu‟s geopolitical and 
historical analysis of Turkey in the international arena. In a general sense, it is 
considered as a re-exposition of Turkey‟s history and geography in the light of recently 
developed international circumstances (Davutoğlu, 2010, p. 43). As KiriĢçi (2009) 
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argues, the importance of the Strategic Depth book proceeds from “its prescriptive 
nature and its introduction of the concept  of  Strategic  Depth  as  a  factor  that  should  
characterize  Turkish  foreign policy.” (p. 36) 
Strategic Depth Doctrine points that the geography, the history and culture that 
Turkey has inherited does not necessarily make Turkey to follow a uni-dimensional 
foreign policy, as it is observed in Turkish history of Turkish foreign policy.  On the 
contrary, geographical position and historical legacy of Turkey provides significant 
alternatives that put Turkey at the center of all geopolitical developments. This 
centrality of Turkey entails fulfilling responsibility of being at the center, rather than 
being directed by other power centers. In order to refrain from entering influence of 
different strategies of power centers, it is argued that Turkey should develop its own 
foreign policy approach (Oğuzlu, 2009, p. 44). 
Davutoğlu puts forwards two main elements which provide Turkey a unique 
position in the international arena. First element is historical legacy of Turkey which 
Davutoğlu refers as historical depth. According to Davutoğlu (2001), there is quite high 
possibility of having new alternatives for Turkey to identify its international position in 
terms of its historical background (p. 65). In this respect, it is crucial the way historical 
legacy can be utilized to overcome existing problems that Turkey has been facing in 
international arena. Second element is geopolitical position of Turkey. Geopolitics, as 
argued above, is the combination of political factors and the physical condition of 
geography. Although it is stable condition, like history, geopolitics comes into play and 
subjects to reassessment in line with altered conditions of international arena when it is 
combined with political and conjunctural factors (Davutoğlu, 2001, pp. 115-116). 
Davutoğlu analyzes geographic location of Turkey in relation with history. He argues 
that: 
“Geographical depth is a part of historical depth. For instance, Turkey is 
not just any old Mediterranean country. One important characteristic that 
distinguishes Turkey from, for instance, Romania or Greece is that Turkey is 
at the same time a Middle Eastern and a Caucasian country. Unlike 
Germany, Turkey is as much a European country as it is an Asian country. 
Indeed, Turkey is as much a Black Sea country as it is a Mediterranean one. 
This geographical depth places Turkey right at the centre of many 
geopolitical influences.” (Turkish Daily News, Interview with Davutoğlu, 
2001) 
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Turkey‟s invaluable historical and geographic position necessitates developing a 
well-rounded geopolitical strategy that could overcome both mental and territorial 
borders. To do this, foreign policy of Turkey should penetrate the time and place 
dimensions at the same time. As Davutoğlu (2001) emphasizes “the analysis of an 
international relations sphere without penetrating its historical depth is similar to a 
psychological analysis ignoring the person‟s memory records.” (p. 551) In the light of 
these arguments, Davutoğlu comes up with a concept of „central country‟ that 
determines Turkey‟s position in the aftermath of 9/11 events.  
Turkey‟s new position as a central country is based on its both ideational and 
geographical roots. Davutoğlu puts forward that thanks to the unique position of 
Turkey, it carries significant features of central country and thus it cannot follow 
defensive foreign policy approach. Therefore, Davutoğlu figures foreign policy of 
Turkey in a proactive manner that could develop policies for its neighborhood.  As the 
baseline of this approach, Davutoğlu points that Turkey‟s security and prosperity is 
depended upon the generation of peaceful and stable order in its surrounding regions 
(KardaĢ, 2012, p. 1). By following a proactive approach, Turkey could become a 
country that maneuver in various regions concurrently so that it gains the ability of 
control over those regions (Davutoğlu, 2008, p. 78). 
Davutoğlu categorizes countries as continental, island, peripheral ones as well as 
the central country status which Turkey holds along with Germany, Russia, and Iran. 
However, Turkey‟s geography gives it a specific central country status, which differs 
from other central countries. Davutoğlu explains that all these three countries are central 
countries, yet each of them is very far from at least one continent. For instance, 
Germany is a central country in Central Europe, which is far from Asia and Africa. 
Russia is another central country in the lands of Europe and Asia, which is far from 
Africa. However, Turkey is located in both Asia and Europe and also is very close to 
Africa. From a geopolitical view, Turkey has control over many transition areas of land 
and sea power centers. Besides, Turkey is located at the intersection point of Caucasus, 
Balkans, Eurasia and Africa. In a similar vein, those regions are tied with the Middle 
East and the Caspian geo-economically thanks to Anatolian peninsula (Davutoğlu, 
2001, p. 116). Thus, it would be a mistaken to approach Turkey as only bridge country 
that ties two different continents or as frontier country or as an ordinary country which 
only belongs to Muslim world or the West. In addition to geographical position, 
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historical and cultural heritage of Turkey are also important elements that strengthen its 
role in its surrounding regions (pp. 78-79). 
In the light of these strategic assets of Turkey, Davutoğlu believes that Turkey 
should figure a new position that maintains security and stability not only for itself, but 
also for its surrounding regions. To do this, Davutoğlu emphasizes that Turkey should 
take a more constructive role as a provider of order, stability, and security in the world 
(p. 79). In this regard, Davutoğlu determines methodological and conceptual foreign 
policy principles of Turkey as a component of the way Turkey would turn into a central 
country.  
Foreign Policy Principles in the AKP era 
In line with the new policy orientation, Davutoğlu introduced three methodological and 
five conceptual foreign policy principles (Davutoğlu, 2009). As methodological foreign 
policy principles, Davutoğlu puts forward having a vision-based strategy, systematic 
framework, and utilizing soft power element in Turkish foreign policy. Through these 
principles, Davutoğlu aims to develop foreign policy which is more capable of taking 
necessary measures at a time of or previous to crises and having consistent framework 
in relations with different players of world politics. For him, a foreign policy 
formulation should be observed from the outside as a product of “one political brain, 
one approach behind.” (Davutoğlu, 2009) With an introduction of soft power concept in 
Turkish foreign policy, Davutoğlu emphasizes the importance of developing a foreign 
policy which is more constructive and consent-based rather than destructive and based 
on coercion. In line with the Strategic Depth Doctrine, Turkey‟s effective use of its soft 
power in the regions where it has cultural and religious ties contributes their 
democratization efforts and Turkey‟s third party role in the surrounding regions 
(AltunıĢık, 2008, p. 47).  
Along with these methodological principles, Davutoğlu (2008) introduces main 
conceptual tools of Turkish foreign policy as follows: balance  between  freedom  and  
security,  zero problems with the neighbors, to develop relations with the neighboring 
regions and beyond,  multi-dimensional  foreign  policy  and  rhythmic  diplomacy.  
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Following the 9/11 events, harmony between security and democracy has been 
called great attention in international arena. Keyman highlights the significance of 
strong democracy in order to conduct efficient foreign policy. He (2010) argues:  
 
“Turkey with a consolidated democracy and multi-cultural modernity will 
be able to maintain its status as soft power and pivotal state in the post-
September/11 world. On the other hand, a Turkey focusing solely on 
geopolitics, security and unilateralism in its foreign policy behavior and 
domestic politics would be a more inward looking and nationalist Turkey” 
(p. 12). 
 
In that environment, Turkey‟s membership process to the EU, which is seen as an 
anchor for consolidating democracy, has always been critical for Turkish foreign policy. 
In the wake of the 9/11 events, Turkey has more concentrated on its regional 
engagements. Vacuum of leadership also strengthened Turkey‟s stance towards 
surrounding regions. Zero-problems policy is put forward as a mechanism in order to 
reach this end. Through this policy, it is planned to eliminate old threat perceptions 
which are embedded in the past foreign policy activities. Normalization of relations 
with neighboring countries and developing more active policies are aimed to be 
integrated with surrounding regions. Hereby, Turkey‟s alignment with the West would 
be strengthened by means of Turkey‟s acknowledgement of its Eastern identity, instead 
of isolating itself from the East (Oğuzlu, 2006, pp. 290-292).   
As a supplementary element of Turkey‟s regional opening, rhythmic diplomacy is 
also offered to make Turkey more involved in potential crises through taking 
preemptive measures or playing a mediator role. In the light of this mechanism, Turkey 
has started to cooperate with the Arab League and Gulf Cooperation, took a more active 
role in Islamic Conference Organization, gained an observer status in the Organization 
of African Unity, and took a non-permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council 
which empowered Turkey‟s reputation in the internal arena. 
To make sense of all these tools in Turkish foreign policy, there is need for 
fundamental change in foreign policy approach. Multi-dimensional foreign policy has 
appeared to fulfill this necessity in Turkish foreign policy.  Multi-dimensionality offers 
strategic diversification of foreign policy activities towards different regions on 
different issues related to economy, politics, or culture at the same time. While Turkey‟s 
cultural and social engagements have been increasing with the Balkans, Caucasus, and 
Central Asian states, its trade volume has increased with the EU, US and the Middle 
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Eastern states. Multi-dimensional foreign policy objects to over-reliance on security and 
identity based, uni-dimensional foreign policy approaches. Rather, it underlines the 
combination of diversified assets of a country in foreign policy formulation.  
Following the years, Turkey‟s role both in the region and in the world will be a 
function of the geo-political developments and Turkey‟s capacity to adapt to them, and 
also of the policies and choices Turkish governments make at home. In order to 
formulate a long-lasting strategic perspective, it is necessary to take into account 
“historical depth” which provides a sound assessment of the links between the past, 
present and the future, and a “geographical depth” penetrating into dynamics of the 
relations between domestic, regional and global factors. Yet, by now, it can be argued 
that Turkey‟s capability of being a global actor has improved substantially while 
Turkey‟s regional engagements have been increasing. Moreover, AKP government has 
managed to utilize the  foreign  politic  as “a  transformative  instrument” to consolidate  
its  domestic  legitimacy  and  political  power (Inat & Duran, 2006, p. 69).  
New Instruments of Turkish Foreign Policy 
This rapid transformation of Turkey‟s domestic and foreign dynamics in the AKP era 
has reflected itself in the way Turkish foreign policy is formulated and conducted. 
Turkey has turned into a country which is experiencing of becoming a regional and 
global player concurrently. To reach and sustain this aim, the main instruments of 
Turkish foreign policy have also changed in this period. New concepts and strategies 
have become evident for Turkish foreign policy makers.  
Through adoption of a proactive, multifaceted and humanitarian foreign policy 
since AKP came to power, cultural and humanitarian diplomacy have become 
prominent foreign policy instruments while Turkey‟s global outreach has been 
increasing in several continents such as Asia, Africa and Latin America. Turkey‟s 
cultural and economic ties with its neighboring countries in the Balkans and the Middle 
East have also been strengthened. Visa requirement for Turkey with 61 countries 
including Syria, Iran, Kosovo, Morocco, Libya, Jordan, Tunisia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakhstan, and Bosnia and Herzegovina have been lifted. Besides, Turkey‟s level of 
cooperation in many areas, from economy, energy to education has been increased 
through High Level Strategic Cooperation Council meetings held between Turkey and 
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its neighbors. Turkey‟s intense diplomatic efforts and mediation initiatives for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Serbia, Iraqi political groups, Israel and Palestine, Israel and 
Syria, Iranian nuclear file, Lebanese political groups, Georgia, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan have contributed to peace and stability in the region as well in the world 
(Ozoner, 2011). 
 In recent years, Turkey‟s cultural heritage has also become more prominent in 
building bridges between neighboring countries. Turkey‟s cultural products, more 
specifically television series has been started to be enjoyed all over the world. It can be 
argued that high level of interest in those series can be pointed as a sign of Turkey‟s 
increasing profile in the Arab World. On government side, the establishment of the 
Yunus Emre Foundation as a conductor of cultural diplomacy of Turkey can be 
regarded as the determination of Turkish foreign policy makers in improving cultural 
diplomacy tools. In 2007, Yunus Emre Foundation was established with the aim of 
“promoting Turkey and the Turkish language, history, culture and arts; presenting 
information across the world regarding Turkey; providing services to those wishing to 
receive education on Turkish language, culture and arts; developing Turkey‟s relations 
and cultural exchanges with other countries.” (Yunuz Emre Foundation, official 
website) The then President of the Foundation, Dr. Ali Fuat Bilkan states that “We are 
not a political but a cultural organization. However, we are taking Turkey‟s strategic 
priorities into consideration when opening centers abroad. Before us, there was no other 
organization promoting Turkish culture abroad.” He indicates that the Yunus Emre 
Institute would become a Turkish version of the British Council, Germany‟s Goethe 
Institute and Spain‟s Cervantes Institute (Özerkan, 2010). As a result of rising 
diplomatic and cultural efforts of Turkey in the light of Strategic Depth Doctrine in 
foreign policy, Turkish Airlines has also broadened its flight network and the Turkish 
Radio and Television Corporation has expanded its broadcasts to reach Turks living 
outside Turkey.  
Besides those cultural and diplomatic developments, humanitarian diplomacy 
has become a significant component of Turkish foreign policy in the AKP era. While 
humanitarian diplomacy efforts of Turkey reveals the aim of a country in managing 
crises within the surrounding regions, it also shows the intention that Turkey is feeling 
responsible for taking part in overcoming global problems. In this regard, it can be 
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argued that Turkey aims to overcome both regional crises and global challenges through 
its humanitarian diplomacy (Davutoğlu, 2013, p. 866). Davutoğlu argues that critical 
balance between conscience and power constitutes the basis humanitarian diplomacy of 
a country.  In this sense, he states that “if a state has conscience but no power, it shows 
weakness. If it has power but no conscience, it becomes a tyranny. Our idea is for 
Turkey to be a compassionate and powerful state.” (p. 866) In line with this idea, 
Davutoğlu underlines Turkey‟s assets such as the Turkish Airlines which have provided 
direct flights even to Mogadishu or TIKA, NGOs, Turkish Red Crescent, and other state 
apparatus which provide the ability to give a hand to the people in need. According to 
Davutoğlu, a strong stance in conducting humanitarian diplomacy will only be possible 
through a combination of passion and with those powerful tools. Otherwise, the result 
would be either cruelty or weakness, as Davutoğlu argues (p. 867). 
 
When all these developments in both foreign policy and domestic policy in the 
AKP era are considered, Turkish foreign aid policy deserves a great attention since the 
way this policy has been formulated and conducted as the result of a combination and 
manifestation of those changes. In this regard, studying Turkish foreign aid policy with 
regard to main institutional body of its, TIKA, as a case study has increased the level of 
explanatory power of this study. While it provides an opportunity to study the impact of 
both domestic and foreign policy changes on a specific policy, it enables to analyzing 
the effect of new foreign aid policy to the process of establishment of new foreign 
policy vision. Turkish foreign aid policy has become one of the most prominent foreign 
policy activities in the AKP period. Combination of methodological and conceptual 
elements introduced by Davutoğlu has been reflected on TIKA‟s activities. Thanks to 
those activities, Turkey has turned into a country which is able to develop policies 
regarding its historical and geographical depth. Having widened foreign policy 
approach with a prospering strategies, such as rhythmic diplomacy, mediator role, or 
normalization of relations with neighboring countries, and humanitarian diplomacy 
have all played important roles in the establishment of comprehensive and constructive 
foreign aid policy. In return, TIKA, as a main government agency, has entered into the 
process of structural transformation in order to fulfill the responsibility emanated from 
pro-active foreign policy approach.  
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As the hypothesis of this study suggests, while the change in foreign policy 
plays an important role in developing a more active and responsive foreign aid policy, 
political stability, democratization process, and economic growth in the AKP period 
have constituted main determinants of this change in foreign aid arena in a dialectical 
manner. A pre-determined and well programmed foreign policy can be seen as a 
derivative of the political stability and economic development of this era which enabled 
AKP government to overcome the limitations of short-termed coalition governments in 
establishing a long-termed strategic planning. By presenting decisive political will, the 
problems originated from lack of coordination between the bureaucratic staff and the 
political authorities have been no longer remained in Turkish politics. In a political 
environment, which is more stable than previous periods, AKP government has 
determined a more coherent foreign policy vision. In addition, evolution of the West in 
foreign policy formulation has played an important role in pursuing an active foreign 
aid policy. Since the West is no longer seen as an end, Turkey has become more able 
widen its foreign aid policy activities in its surrounding regions with the use of its 
geographical, historical and cultural assets and in a wider range of areas. In contrast to 
previous mindset claiming that multifaceted foreign policy would deteriorate the 
relations with the West, Turkey has strengthened its alignment with the West as well in 
this period.   
With respect to all these developments in the AKP era through the lenses of new 
imagination of the West, the change in Turkish foreign aid policy becomes inevitable 
for Turkey in realizing its objectives in the international arena. As an outcome of the 
dialectical interaction among those factors, Turkey has taken several steps in order to 
have an influential foreign aid policy that makes it regional, yet more importantly, rising 
emerging power in the international system. In the lack of the alteration of the West 
imagination or economic growth, this change would not emerge. Combination of socio-
economic developments with the newly established foreign policy vision provides the 
necessary conditions for Turkey in the process of being a donor country. While Turkey 
raises its international profile thanks to becoming more democratic, it could manage to 
have necessary economic growth that enable it to increase its development aid activities 
in 133 countries. The rise of non-traditional donors in the international development 
arena, on the other hand, has provided great opportunity for Turkey. Due to its new 
interpretation of the West as a system in which Turkey is part of it and its new foreign 
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policy formulation, Turkey has succeeded to conduct foreign aid policies outside of the 
West while intending to be a central power within this system.  
Based on this argument, I will elucidate the transformation of TIKA and the 
foreign aid policy of Turkey in the next chapter. In order to reveal the change, I aim to 
explain the history of Turkish foreign aid from the beginning of it. More specifically, I 
will deal with the organizational transformation of TIKA in the AKP era under the 
influence of all defined factors above. 
PART IV: TURKISH FOREIGN AID POLICY AND THE CASE OF TIKA  
Development Assistance and Turkish Foreign Policy  
The evolution of Turkey‟s experience in development assistance has been reflective of 
the broader transformations in Turkey‟s domestic and foreign policy orientation 
(KardaĢ, 2013; Kulaklıkaya & Nurdan, 2010). In this regard, first, I will scrutinize the 
political history of Turkish aid with regard of foreign policy changes to explain the 
recent change in Turkish foreign aid policy. To begin with, some major questions 
should be answered in order to contextualize Turkey‟s foreign aid policy: What is the 
political history of Turkish aid? How can prominent features of Turkey‟s international 
development aid be clarified? How is the connection between international development 
policy and Turkish foreign policy transformation explained?  
“Foreign Aid” and International Politics 
Before going into detail of Turkish foreign aid policy, it should be better to 
operationalize the concept of foreign aid in order to prevent any confusion about the 
concept. Akçay (2012) defines foreign aid as the flow of materials and resources both in 
cash and in kind from developed countries to developing or less-developed ones (p. 7). 
Yet, there are divergent views about the definition of the foreign aid in international 
relations. To overcome this divergence, OECD DAC developed some criteria to 
differentiate ODA from other forms of aid in 1961. According to this definition, ODA 
is: 
“flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and 
to multilateral development institutions which are provided by official 
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agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive 
agencies; and each transaction of which is administered with the promotion 
of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its 
main objective and is concessional in character and conveys a grant 
element of at least 25 per cent.” (OECD, 2008, p. 1) 
As this definition also suggests, ODA contains three kinds of aid as “official 
development assistance, official aid and other official flows.” The first one contains 
both direct and indirect aid to the least or middle developed nations with the aim of 
contributing economic development and welfare. The official aid is given to multilateral 
development institutions ad developing nations. The other official flows include indirect 
aids which aim to contribute development or transfer a grant element of less than 25%. 
For this area, all kinds of activities such as “projects and programs, cash transfers, 
deliveries of goods, training courses, research projects, debt relief operations and 
contributions to non-governmental organizations” are seen as eligible for ODA criteria 
(OECD, 2008). 
Besides strong emphasis on contribution of economic development and welfare, 
there is a high level of correlation between foreign policy agenda and foreign aid policy 
of a state. According to HaĢimi (2014), “realistically and carefully crafted national 
interests” shape main policies, strategies, and priorities of foreign aid policy (p. 131). In 
contrast to the negative connation of this relationship raised by some academics or 
politicians, this relationship is also seen as a main expression of humanity or global 
responsibility. However, there is a consensus about the necessity of aid in international 
politics (p. 131). In this regard, increasing scope of Turkish foreign aid can be 
interpreted as a reflection of new priorities of Turkish foreign policy as being „central 
country‟ which has a word in global context. With this aim, Turkish foreign policy 
makers in recent years have re-designed the link between Turkish foreign policy and 
international aid activities in line with new international order. Thanks to domestic 
developments in Turkey during AKP governance as argued in previous parts, Turkey 
has managed to develop highly efficient foreign aid policy. In order to explain one of 
the most prominent changes in Turkish foreign policy, I will scrutinize the history of 
TIKA. While explaining the history of TIKA, I will also try to elucidate main policies 
related to Turkish foreign aid policy and main issues in Turkish foreign policy. By 
doing so, I aim to display the way Turkish foreign policy transformation reflects itself in 
presence of TIKA and Turkish foreign aid policy. By emphasizing domestic and foreign 
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changes, I will also try to stress on the impact of dialectic relationship of those changes 
on the development of Turkish foreign aid policy.  
Turkey’s Experience with Foreign Aid  
A quick glance at the Turkey‟s foreign aid activities both as a recipient and a donor 
country shows a direct link between Turkish political and economic stability and its 
self-defined role of Turkey in global politics (HaĢimi, 2014, p. 131). By taking this link 
into consideration, it should be useful to apply Akçay‟s (2012) division of Turkish 
political history in terms of foreign aid. He determines three periods between 1923-
1992, 1992-1999, and 1999 to the present time (p. 63). For the first period, Turkey only 
appears as a receiver country in the international arena. The second period begins with 
the establishment of TIKA. In this period, to overcome major problems of organizing 
aid activities under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was seen as main objective of TIKA. 
In spite of those objectives, Turkish foreign aid stayed limited to Turkic countries of the 
Central Asia and Caucasia and TIKA could not make much progress at that period (pp. 
73-76). The third period is the one that Turkish foreign aid policy has been developing 
and turning into an effective foreign policy tool which was started in 2002 when the 
AKP came to power. Besides the effect of economic and political capabilities, each 
period reveals the complexity of Turkey‟s foreign policy alternatives.  
Turkey as an ODA Recipient Country 
The foreign aid activities of Turkey in the first period were mostly implemented by 
personal efforts of diplomats or bureaucrats whom were working at relative 
communities. Therefore, these activities could not be implemented with a well-planned 
foreign policy strategy (Akçay, 2012, p. 64). Besides those efforts, Turkey has been 
regarded as an aid recipient country since the late 1940s. Initially, Turkey met with 
ODA with the Marshall Plan which was put into practice by the U.S. to increase the 
number of pro-Western regimes formed in Europe after the Second World War. In this 
context, Turkey received $150 million of aid, which consequently brought along an 
efficient drive to the Turkish economic development in the 1950s (Kulaklıkaya & 
Nurdun, 2010, p. 132). 
Along with the US, Japan and Germany are two other donors of Turkish 
economic development. Besides those countries, multilateral international institutions, 
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specifically Asian Development Fund (ADF), the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD), have also played an important role in Turkish development through delivering 
foreign aid (Kulaklıkaya & Nurdun, 2010, pp. 132-133). Until the mid-1980s, Turkey 
continued to be only recipient country. Yet, from then on, Turkey, as first, started to 
give aids and to plan aid activities under the supervision of the State Planning 
Organization (SPO) until the establishment of TIKA in 1992. However, aid activities of 
that period are seen as very limited and insufficient. Therefore, these efforts cannot be 
regarded as Turkey‟s emergence of a donor country in 1980s or 1990s.  
From A Recipient to an Emerging Donor Country 
Although Turkey is still listed as an aid recipient country by the OECD DAC, it has 
entered into a new stage of development cooperation as a rising donor country since 
2004. However, in order to understand this remarkable change in Turkish development 
aid, it should be useful to go back the years of 1980s on which Turkey implemented a 
comprehensive package for the first time. In 1985, SPO delivered $10 million to 
Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal, Somali, and Sudan (Birtek, 1996, 
p. 37). The main motivation behind this new orientation can be argued as a reflection of 
altered foreign policy priorities of Özal government of the 1980s. This new set of 
framework gave precedence to increase Turkey‟s positive image in an international 
environment, to integrate Turkish economy to the global economy, and to improve 
Turkey‟s trade relations with developing countries by using foreign aid as a significant 
foreign policy tools. Besides those changes in the foreign policy vision, Turkey‟s 
economic growth in the period in between 1984-1989 which was actualized through the 
export-oriented growth strategy fostered the government in launching aid programs. 
This initiative in foreign policy played a crucial role in increasing Turkey‟s visibility in 
the international arena and its trade volume through the exploration of new markets to 
exports its goods (Kulaklıkaya & Nurdun, 2010, p. 134). However, it should be also 
added that TIKA experts associate Turkish government‟s aid activities with the state 
tradition of previous empires, including Turks living in the Central Asia, Great Seljuk 
Empire, and Ottoman Empire. According to them, history of those empires show that 
whenever they immigrate, conquer, or settle to a new place, they put their efforts on 
developing better conditions. In this regard, one of TIKA experts points out high 
number of fountains in Ottoman territories and argues that today TIKA‟s water projects 
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in several continents are conducted with this motivation in mind (Personal 
Communication, July 15, 2014). 
Turkish Foreign Aid Policy toward Central Asia 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, new political options became 
available for Turkey in the Central Asia and the Caucasus. This unexpected collapse of 
the Soviet Union generated great opportunity for Turkey to renew its relationship with 
the long-forgotten Turkic states in Central Asia (Winrow, 1998, p. 96). With this newly 
emerged euphoria, the then President of Turkey Turgut Özal said “the twenty-first 
century will be the century of the Turks.” (Karpat, 2003, p. 316) 
At that time, there is a huge debate about whether Turkey was going to be a “model 
country” for Central Asia and the Caucasus or not. The Turkish model underlines three 
main features of Turkey which are secularism, liberal democracy, and a market 
economy. As having seen as Muslim country which has these features, it is expected 
that Turkey serve as a model for other Muslim majority countries that Turkey has both 
religious and ethnic ties (Winrow, 2000, p. 117). One of the main motivations of 
Western countries which were highly supportive of this model is to curb remaining 
Soviet weight and Iranian influence on the Central Asian countries (Demirtepe & 
Özkan, 2012, p. 648). Turkey approached these new international developments as a 
valuable opportunity to develop its relationships with regional countries and help them 
in forming their relationship with the international community. To do so, Turkey 
believed that it could get rid of the pressure of isolation which was instigated by the 
Western countries that attribute Turkey to strategic value as a barrier to Soviet 
expansion (Çelik, 1999, p. 23). Many in Turkey believed that this new activism of 
Turkey in post-Soviet countries would enhance Turkey‟s international image and 
prospects of Turkey‟s admission to the EU, which was rejected in 1989 (Winrow, 1998, 
p. 91).  
With these aims in mind, Turkey started to cooperate with the Turkic states 
through setting up telecommunications and air links, granting scholarship for Turkic 
students to study at Turkish universities, and organizing training courses for Turkic 
diplomats and businessmen (Winrow, 1998, p. 117). In addition, several high level 
visits were realized and nearly 500 bilateral and multilateral agreements were signed 
between Turkey and the Central Asian countries since 1992. Following these 
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developments, the then Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel proclaimed a 
“gigantic Turkish world” was forming from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China 
(Karasar & KuĢkumbayev, 2009, p. 26).  
To summarize, three main motivations can be listed for Turkish foreign policy 
toward the Central Asia in 1990s. First is to improve Turkey‟s standing in international 
relations as a bridge between East and the West. Second is to guarantee its security by 
securing allies with countries which Turkey shared political, economic and cultural 
links. Third is to increase economic growth through having cooperated with the 
resource-rich countries (Çelik, 1999, p. 122). However, Turkey had faced both domestic 
and international constraints that prevented successfully implementation of active 
foreign policy in the Central Asia. These constraints will be examined following section 
in this chapter. 
Establishment of TIKA: Institutionalization of Turkey’s ODA policy 
With this international environment and Turkey‟s foreign policy objectives as such, 
TIKA was formed under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1992. Naturally, it turned 
into one of the important soft power tools of Turkish government. TIKA became 
responsible for enhancing social, cultural, economic, and political cooperation between 
Turkey and the Central Asian countries. Indeed, the international environment which 
was encouraging for Turkish model played a significant role in the establishment of 
TIKA as well (Demirtepe & Özkan, 2012, p. 648). 
As set forth by Law No. 4688, the objectives and the main roles of TIKA were 
determined as follows: 1) developing economic, commercial, technical,  social, cultural, 
and educational relationships between Turkey and developing countries; 2) organizing 
projects and programs that may help to the development of developing countries; 3) 
giving technical assistance for personnel and students of these countries through 
providing training and internship opportunities; 4) performing educational and cultural 
cooperation programs in the foreign countries; 5) ensuring the necessary cooperation 
and coordination with regard to the main services and duties (TIKA, 2008, p. 7). 
During the 1990s, TIKA was conducting many projects on providing technical 
assistance with the aim of strengthening institution building and capacity development 
in the area of agriculture and service sectors. Yet, these projects were not limited only to 
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technical assistance but also to projects about commercial banking and central banking, 
tax training, improvement of the private sector, tourism, customs, diplomacy, public 
governance, insurance, statistics, agriculture, development of small- and medium-sized 
enterprises, as well as social cooperation in the. With these projects, Turkey became the 
first country in cooperating with Eurasian countries (Fidan & Nurdun, 2008, pp. 103-
04). Turkey‟s total amount of development aid reached to $3.75 billion in the period 
between 1992 and 2003. In 1992, over a billion dollars of this aid was delivered to the 
Turkic states of Uzbekistan ($755 million), Kazakhstan ($216 million), Turkmenistan 
($94.5 million), Azerbaijan ($37 million) and Kyrgyzstan ($26 million) (Parlak, 2007, 
p. 74). However, Turkey was not very successful in sustaining delivering similar 
amount of aid in the following years of 1990s. As SPO report of 1998 states that 
Turkey‟s aid budget to the Turkic states stayed around $80 million in 1992, which was 
very modest in comparison to the beginning of 1990s (pp. 11-12). 
In terms of the countries that TIKA was delivering the development aid from 
1997 to 2003, there was not much change. Specifically, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan were the main receivers of TIKA‟s projects (Parlak, 2007, 
p. 133). Thanks to the high amount of Turkish bilateral aid in 1992, the ratio of Turkish 
foreign aid to the Gross National Income was about 0.74 %. However, with the decrease 
in the amount of aid that Turkey delivered, this percentage also dropped gradually over 
the years (DIE, 2002, p. 2). 
Before 2005 on which TIKA became responsible for making calculations of 
Turkey‟s foreign aid according to OECD DAC criteria, there were serious problems 
about cooperation between Turkish official bodies and the OECD (DPT, 1998, p. 21). In 
addition, measurement of Turkey‟s foreign aid statistics was not standardized in this 
period. SPO only included bilateral aid into its calculations. Therefore, Turkey‟s 
contribution to the international organization or other type of humanitarian assistance 
was not counted in the calculations. Similarly, SPO and DIE did not count in statistics 
Turkey‟s contributions to Ahmet Yesevi and Manas Universities, in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan in 1993 and 1997, respectively, and the full extent of Turkish Eximbank 
credits (p. 160). As a result of this lack of coordination, the total amount of Turkey‟s 
foreign aid could not be calculated properly at that period.  
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In spite of all these efforts of TIKA, it could not be very successful as a new 
actor in the community of development assistance due to the number of domestic and 
international constraints that Turkey faced during the 1990s. In the next section of this 
chapter, I will try to explain those constraints.   
Domestic and International Impediments for Turkey in the 1990s  
The constraints that TIKA encountered can be summarized into two dimensions, 
domestic and international, as follows: (1) Turkish economy was not enough strong to 
be major supplier of foreign aid; (2) Turkish democracy was also not consolidated 
enough to be model for the post-Soviet countries; (3) Turkey had to overcome its PKK 
problem. In terms of international factors, (1) as a result of end of the Cold War, several 
ethnic and national conflicts emerged which led to the instability and insecurity to the 
region; (2) Turkey overrated its capability to play a political, cultural, and economic 
role in development of the newly independent republics; and (3) Central Asian states 
were still under influence of the Russian Federation (Mutlu, 20120, p. 133). 
Due to these constraints, TIKA could not be very successful in carrying out its 
objective in the region during 1990s. It could not turn into a well-organized agency that 
was able to perform effective projects in terms of the amount and geographical scope. 
Between 1992 and 2002, TIKA could only open 12 Program Coordination Offices and 
implement activities in 28 countries (TIKA, 2013, p. 4). As TIKA expert puts forward 
political and economic instability in Turkey along with the international developments 
were the main reasons of this failure of TIKA in 1990s. He argues that fragile coalition 
governments and military intervention into politics hampered the consolidation of 
political and economic stability in Turkey (Personal Communication, June 6, 2014).In 
this environment, TIKA turned into a domestic political instrument of political parties, 
so that failed to concentrate on its major objectives. Particularly, administrative 
uncertainty with regard to who would or should be in charge of TIKA politically in 
coalition governments obstructed it from re-organizing its organizational structure. 
Besides those domestic constraints, the loss of attractiveness of Turkish model in the 
eyes of Western countries and the rise of Russia‟s power over the former Soviet 
territories had also played an important role in weakening TIKA effectiveness in the 
region (Demirtepe & Özkan, 2012, p. 648). 
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Another important reason that Turkey failed to be effective in delivering 
development aid to the Turkic states is the lack of financial capability, organizational 
ability and commitments of those respective countries. Furthermore, the management of 
Turkish aid was given to individuals who did not have expertise on international 
relations and aid programs (Yılmaz, 2002, pp. 189-192). The atmosphere of the aid 
agreements was also not realistic and mostly based on emotions and mutual trust 
between the two sides. With respect to these reasons, TIKA‟s role in the Turkish 
development aid activities was limited to a small budget and lack of professionalism. 
The institutional relationship among TIKA coordination offices abroad and Turkish 
embassies was not without problems as well (Parlak, 2007, p. 165). Therefore, the 
domestic, international and economic problems Turkey faced in the 1990s were of 
important causes obstructing the success of TIKA as a newly formed Turkish 
development aid agency and Turkey as a new actor as a donor country. 
Transformation of TIKA and Turkish ODA Policy in 2000s 
As I have argued above, Akçay emphasizes that the beginning of the third period in the 
history of Turkish foreign aid began when the TIKA became under the authority of the 
Prime Ministry in 1999. With this change in administrative status of TIKA, it 
transformed into the main Turkish official development agency, operating in several 
states, such as Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Palestinian Authority, Sudan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kosovo, Ethiopia and Afghanistan. In some other 
countries that TIKA does not have a field office; Turkish embassies come into play in 
conducting projects (Personal Communication, July 15, 2014). Hereby, TIKA managed 
to enlarge the variety and geographical scope of its activities. Yet, the decline in the 
amount of Turkish foreign aid continued until 2003.  
The systematic and structural change in Turkish foreign aid policy coincided 
with the time when the AKP came into power in November 2002. This governmental 
transition came into existence with a specific reference to the increasing role of Turkey 
in global politics. In the following years, this specific reference evolved into a central 
country model in the studies and speeches of Foreign Minister of Davutoğlu. Along 
with the transformation in Turkish foreign policy, economic and political stability in 
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Turkey have played an important role in the transformation of TIKA and Turkish 
foreign aid policy (Personal Communication, July 15, 2014). A newly emerging 
international setting that encourage emerging economies to become donor countries of 
foreign aid also influenced the re-orientation in Turkish ODA policy. In such an 
environment where domestic dynamics enter into scene, TIKA had the chance of re-
arranging its vision, mission, and its administrative structure. In this regard, TIKA has 
adopted new internationally accepted criteria in foreign aid and has aligned itself with 
international development policies. Consequently, TIKA could overcome some 
organizational problems by cooperating with other international development agencies. 
Thanks to all these developments, Turkey has placed itself as an emerging donor 
country in the international aid arena.  
Re-birth of TIKA since 2002 
According to the reports published in 2003 by the Turkish Statistical Institute 
(TURKSTAT) and SPO, official development aid flows given by Turkey has reached to 
$3.8 billion of which $98 million of technical assistance belonged to TIKA. TIKA‟s 
share of foreign aid went to Kazakhstan (47 percent), Azerbaijan (13 percent), 
Turkmenistan (9.4 percent), Crimea (8.6 percent) and finally to other countries (13 
percent) (Fidan & Nurdun, 2008, p. 100). The amount of official development aid has 
reached to $339 million in 2004 which helped Turkey to place itself among the 
„emerging donor‟ countries (TIKA, 2004). The understanding of direct monetary aid 
started to change within the scope of the development in 2003 with the increasing 
amount of project based assistance instead of direct monetary donations. This led to the 
enhancement of Turkey‟s visibility and reliability in the region. According to TIKA 
expert who operated in the field several times, Turkey‟s specific development model 
has been appreciated by the receiver countries and gives TIKA priority among other 
development agencies in those countries (Personal Communication, July 15, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
60 
  
Figure 2: Distribution of TIKA Foreign Aid According to Recipient Countries  
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The increasing amount of aid started in 2003 followed the same trend during the 
AKP period despite fluctuations at some periods. Finally, as of 2013 TIKA has 
transformed itself into an agency which has 35 offices in 32 countries and operated in 
110 countries from all continents. The countries TIKA involved in projects ranges from 
Asia to Africa, Europe to Latin America and Middle East which shows the geographical 
depth of aid activities of Turkey (TIKA, 2012). The number of aid projects 
implemented between 2002 and 2013 has reached to 13000 compared to only 2241 
projects between 1992 and 2002. In addition, TIKA‟s budget has been raised to 840.289 
million TL in between 2002-2013 while it has only one third of this amount in the 
period from 1992 to 2003. The report refers that this huge increase of TIKA budget is 
the reflection of success in economy and foreign policy arena of Turkish government 
(TIKA, 2014).  
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Figure 3: The Number of Projects Implemented by TIKA (2002-2012) 
 
 
Thanks to increasing trend of ODA in this period, Turkey has gained worldwide 
recognition. This prominent rising in ODA was crowned when Turkey‟s ODA ratio to 
country GDP was ranked first in the world in 2011 and 2012. Besides, Turkey became 
the 4
th
 largest donor country in proportion to its GDP in humanitarian aid which is $2.53 
billion.  
Figure 4: Turkey‟s Official International Aid Between 2003 and 2012 (million USD) 
 
Yet, Turkey‟s international assistance is not only limited to ODA. Direct 
investments, urgent humanitarian aid, and NGOs also have significant roles in Turkey‟s 
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international aid program. The table below presents a comparison of development aid 
and ODA since 2009 (TIKA, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012).  
Table 1: Total Development Aid and ODA 
Year Total Development Aid Total ODA NGOs 
2012 3324,83 2533,30 111,65 
2011 2363,45 1273,01 119,52 
2010 1718,18 967,42 105,68 
2009 1519,65 707,17 109,00 
 
Turkey has been identified with a systematic focus on increasing development 
assistance and humanitarian aid in the last decade. Turkey‟s policy towards the LDCs 
and „open door policy‟ towards Syrians in recent years have been the two significant 
instances of this process. From 2011, Turkey‟s aid to LDCs has exceeded $250 billion 
for the first time (TIKA, 2014). 
Turkey became the first non-Western country that hosted the 4
th
 UN Conference 
on LDCs in May 2011. The number of participants was 10000 with the participation of 
NGOs, 36 heads of state and government, 96 ministers and 66 presidents of 
international organizations. The Conference marked one of the crucial events by 
addressing the needs of 48 countries with 900 million population which are of the 
lowest indicators of Human Development Index (HDI) and GDP per capita (Conference 
Official website, n.d). At the end of the Conference, the declaration named „Istanbul 
Program of Action‟ which outlines the main pathways of development for the LDCs in 
the next decade was signed. Along with the Istanbul Program of Action, the then Prime 
Minister Erdoğan declared economic and technical cooperation package for LDCs. In 
addition, Turkey has committed to provide $200 million for every year to LDCs for the 
implementation technical cooperation project (HaĢimi, pp. 137-138). As one of the most 
prominent emerging donor countries, Turkey has proved its role as being leading actor 
of the international community through raising its assistance to the LDCs.  
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Functioning of TIKA 
TIKA‟s organizational transformation takes the shape of more autonomous power when 
it is designated as a main coordinating and monitoring agency for Turkey‟s foreign aid 
policy in 2005 by the Prime Ministry through law number 4668 (two circulars issued: 
2005/11; 2007/12701). With this change, TIKA became responsible for coordinating 
public aid projects, finding different funding sources, and collecting and analyzing data. 
Main motivation of centralizing Turkish aid coordination under TIKA was to prevent 
overlaps in project-based ODA and aid ineffectiveness. Likewise, TIKA established the 
Department of Coordination and Cooperation with Non-Governmental Organizations to 
comply with overseas aid projects of NGOs with official programs (TIKA, 2009). 
TIKA projects are organized through the Prime Minister‟s office cooperation 
with foreign affairs, development, defense, education, and health ministries. The 
directives are passed to TIKA through the senior government bureaucracy. Inversely, a 
demand can also come from a recipient country by the way of a TIKA office operating 
in that country. In accordance with the project, TIKA convey the demand to the suitable 
ministry in Turkey. This ministry or high level government agency determines the 
amount of aid and number of the officer for deployment in reply to the project demand. 
Four main funds constitute the funding sources of TIKA: a main budget; project budget 
that delivered by the Prime Ministry; funds that are delivered by other governmental 
agencies; funds received by international organizations (Murphy & Sazak, 2012, pp. 12-
13). 
Since TIKA fulfills its missions through governmental channels, the types of 
protocols that arrange strategic planning or decision making procedure may diversify. 
Yet, aid proposals are seen as the most common way. As an initial step, aid recipient 
country puts forward a proposal. If the proposal is confirmed by TIKA, administrators 
step in the process and coordinate the project (Personal Communication, July 15, 2014). 
Sazak and Murphy (2012) elaborate this process with an example: if the Ministry of 
Justice in Sudan submits a proposal for judicial branch/legislative training and the 
project is accepted, TIKA personnel in Sudan work through TIKA/Ankara who 
subsequently out-sources training from the Ministry of Justice in Ankara. Such projects 
are demand driven and bilaterally operated. Similarly, the Ministry of Justice in Sudan 
may also directly contact the Ministry of Justice in Turkey. In this scenario, TIKA 
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would come into play by providing assistance to both ministries. As a second type of 
protocol for projects, TIKA, the government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Prime 
Ministry, or the President may directly pass directives (pp. 13-14).  
In terms of the types of protocols, it can be argued that TIKA mostly prefer to 
make bilateral development assistance arrangements. Almost 90% of aid assistance is 
operated directly between TIKA and the aid recipient country since bilateral projects are 
seen as more effective and easier to conduct. Because, as Turkish law suggests, 
whenever Turkey cooperates with an intergovernmental organization, the Turkish 
Parliament should ratify the agreement (p. 14). For implementing projects, TIKA has 
always initiated a tender in the donor country. This way of functioning, as argued by the 
TIKA expert, is one of the main differences of Turkish development model in 
comparison to other development agencies and increases the effectiveness of projects by 
reducing the costs. Besides the effectiveness, initiating a tender provides a great 
opportunity for Turkish companies in increasing their commercial activities at receiver 
countries if they are able to win the respective tender (Personal Communication, July 
15, 2014). 
In line with the aim of coordinating TIKA‟s activities, a particular Deputy Prime 
Minister is also assigned to monitor the conducting of each major aid campaign with 
associated institutions, and representatives of relevant ministries, such as AFAD, 
Turkish Red Crescent, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education and so on 
(HaĢimi, 2014, p. 139). In all the foreign aid activities of Turkey, historical, cultural, 
and political values are stressed as a prominent reference to the Turkish identity. 
Humanitarian assistance is seen as an indispensable part of Turkish identity which is 
also believed that lead to the foundation of a new global order by way of revitalizing the 
long-forgotten legacy of Turkish identity (pp. 139-140). As argued in the previous 
section, maintaining the „state tradition‟ constitutes the philosophical basis of those 
humanitarian activities.  
TIKA Activities 
In the AKP era, the scope of TIKA‟s projects has varied in a wide range from cultural 
projects, to capacity/institution buildings ones or to a region specific projects. All these 
projects show a great deal of alignment with foreign policy objectives of Turkey. The 
Turcology Project is the prominent one among cultural projects implemented by TIKA. 
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Within the scope of this project, TIKA supports Turkish language teaching and 
education in the neighboring countries. In 2005 and 2006, 16 countries were in the 
scope of this project. In addition, 25 Turkish scholars, 14 local scholars, and a number 
of support staff are deployed. Through the Turcology Project, libraries and Turkish 
Language and Culture Centers were formed. Fidan and Nurdun (2008) also highlight the 
economic benefits of this project by arguing that many people who participated to this 
educational program gain opportunity to find well-paid jobs. They also gain the chance 
to work in Turkish companies operating in those regions in which high level of 
unemployment is a severe problem (p. 105). Thanks to tremendous impression and 
success of the project, it was institutionalized and TIKA assigned its role of 
implementing the project to Yunus Emre Institute which was established in 2012 
(TIKA, 2014). According to the TIKA expert, this project is a sign that reveals high 
level of quality and sustainability of TIKA projects (Personal Communication, July 15, 
2014). 
TIKA‟s capacity-building activities implemented on a regional basis in the AKP 
era have also been very successful. The most significant one is OECD-TIKA Istanbul 
Private Sector Development Centre. The major mission of the centre is to train 
government personnel of countries from Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Trans-
Caucasia. The scope of training program has covered many areas, such as the 
privatization and restructuring of state-owned enterprises, the role and structure of 
public sector enterprises, competition policy and de-monopolization, foreign 
investment, banking and insurance, accounting, development of SMEs, and legal 
reforms (OECD – Istanbul Centre Report). TIKA‟s total contribution has reached to 
$3,366,000 for this project. Throughout the years, this centre has turned into a regional 
OECD centre which constitutes a forum for policy dialogue and regional cooperation on 
main issues that are seen problematic for those transition economies. In line with this 
aim, the centre has also provided a great opportunity for less developed transition 
economies through bringing together representatives from OECD member countries and 
more advanced Eastern European countries to share and exchange their activities (Fidan 
& Nurdun, 2008, p. 104).  
In terms of the region and specific countries that TIKA delivers aid, Turkic 
states have remained as the main focus in the AKP era. A total of 803 of TIKA‟s 1309 
projects and activities in Asia went to the development of socio-economic 
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infrastructure, improvement of productions and communication sectors, cultural 
cooperation and contributions to social peace and humanitarian aid in Central Asia and 
Caucasus between 2004 and 2006 (TIKA Annual Report, 2008). Problems in education 
and health sector in the Turkic states have constituted main concerns for TIKA. In this 
regard, most of the development aid projects have been implemented on the areas of 
social infrastructure and services (TIKA Annual Report, 2006). 
 As a specific country that TIKA has been delivering a high amount of aid, 
Afghanistan takes the lead. Especially, after the collapse of Taliban regime, Afghanistan 
became one of the most important countries for Turkey‟s foreign policy priorities. In 
accordance Turkish foreign principle of AKP government, balance between security and 
freedom, Turkey has made a significant effort for reconstruction of Afghanistan through 
providing basic services, establishing new system of freedoms and rights, and 
consolidating domestic stability. In addition, TIKA has also concentrated on projects in 
the fields of education, health, and water supply (Kulaklıkaya & Nurdun, 2010, p. 136). 
Turkey‟s foreign policy toward Afghanistan has also constituted a keystone of the joint 
Turkey-Transatlantic security agenda. Yet, although Turkey has aligned itself with 
Western countries policies towards Afghanistan and deployed troops to the ISAF, it has 
also clearly emphasized that it has not been in favor of military solution to the conflict. 
In this regard, Turkey has laid stress on its civilian approach to the peace-building in 
Afghanistan (KardaĢ, 2013, pp. 2-3).  
In recent years, an important aim of Turkish foreign policy has been to extend 
the scope of Turkey‟s active involvement in its immediate neighborhood and also to 
address other global issues. Once Turkish foreign policy framework is shaped through a 
globalist language, Turkey has established new relations with different continents while 
developing its ties with international organizations. In this regard, Turkish leaders have 
frequently made a visit to African, Asian, or Latin American capitals to create strategic 
partnerships with new actors (KardaĢ, 2013, p.3). In this regard, Turkish government 
started to implement development cooperation activities in Africa in 2004 in line with 
the framework of „Opening Up to Africa‟ policy. Turkey declared the following year as 
„the Year of Africa in Turkey‟ and TIKA founded its first office in African continent at 
Ethiopia. TIKA has also established more offices in Sudan and Senegal in order to cope 
with the challenges faced by African countries. Along with their roles in these 
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respective countries, offices have also served as liaison offices for the countries in the 
neighboring regions.  
In 2006, Turkey‟s total official development has reached to $51.73 million 
which is five times greater than the amount in 2005. Yet, Turkey was committed to 
increase this amount which led to a further $5 million assistance allocation by Turkey 
for the LDCs. Turkey has also focused on capacity building projects in African 
countries. In line with this aim, Turkey has organized vocational training courses which 
take place in Turkey or in partner countries in specific sectors. Besides these activities, 
TIKA has implemented many projects in building physical infrastructures for the 
provision of social services such as schools and hospitals (Kulaklıkaya & Nurdun, 2010, 
p. 137). Furthermore, many of Turkey‟s non-governmental humanitarian aid 
organizations have run several projects in Africa. Turkey‟s desire for a non-permanent 
UN Security Council seat for 2010-2011 has enhanced Turkish aid activities in Africa. 
Today, increasing number of Turkish embassies in Africa are in line with the new TIKA 
offices in the continent (Personal Communication, July 15, 2014). 
In line with its African policy, Turkey has also attempted to implement 
development projects in the Middle Eastern countries, such as Lebanon, Palestine, 
Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. In this region, Turkey has played an important role as a 
regional peace broker and mediator in the region. Subsequent to the Arab Spring, 
Turkey has intensified its involvements to those countries which have been passing 
through social, economic, and political transformation (KardaĢ, 2013, p. 3). For 
example, Turkey delivered $11.73 million aid to Iraq of which Turkey‟s total 
emergency aid reached to $31.08 million in 2008. In addition, ten trucks including 
fundamental needs and 15 ambulances were donated to the Palestinians. Likewise, aid 
packages containing foods, cleaning materials, medicine, and vaccines, and tents were 
delivered to Georgia after its conflict with Russia in 2008 (Kulaklıkaya & Nurdun, p. 
137). 
In line with the „zero problem with the neighbors‟ principle in Turkish foreign 
policy, Turkey has put an emphasis on developing maximum cooperation and economic 
integration with its neighbors. In this regard, Turkey made numerous high level 
strategic council meetings with Syria and Iraq. In order to give acceleration to the zero 
problem policy, Turkish government opened a regional TIKA program coordination 
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office in Syria. Through this office, the government also aimed to strengthen its 
relations with the Middle Eastern countries. It should also be noted that Turkey has 
promoted its ties with the several international organizations as well with the aim of 
increasing its influence in global politics. Hence, TIKA delivered a substantial amount 
of voluntary contributions to multilateral organizations, such as the OECD, UNDP, 
UNIDO, and FAO to develop aid programs for developing countries.  
When all development assistance of TIKA is considered, it can be argued that 
while in some cases the main motivation is solely global humanitarian consideration, in 
other cases, cultural and historical heritage constitute the main motivation behind 
TIKA‟s projects. As KardaĢ (2013) argues that the then Foreign Minister Davutoğlu‟s 
emphasis on “Turkey‟s historic responsibility towards civilizational kin” has reinforced 
directing aid to those specific regions (p. 3). In addition to the technical assistance 
projects that are aiming to improve economic and political development of countries 
places in the Ottoman-Turkish cultural zone, Turkey has also concentrated on the 
discovery or restoration of historic artifacts or monuments in a geography stretching 
from Mongolia to the Balkans. Likewise, Turkey has focused on promotion of the study 
of Turkish language and culture as well as granting scholarship by the way of intending 
to enhance its soft-power in its surrounding regions. Yet, Turkey has also been very 
careful about the image that Turkey‟s aid policy targets not only countries of which 
Turkey has historical and cultural ties. To that end, both public and non-governmental 
sources of Turkey have been transferred for humanitarian emergencies worldwide 
which stress the globalist highlighting of Turkish foreign policy (Personal 
Communication, June 6, 2014). KardaĢ (2013) points out the UN LDCs summit 
arranged in Istanbul as sign of Turkey‟s alignment with the global discourse on 
development issues (p. 4). 
Adjusting TIKA to the International Development Aid Community  
Along with the improvement of functioning of TIKA, its level of cooperation with 
international development aid community has been increased and collection methods of 
ODA data have been complied with DAC guidelines. This change in the collection 
methods has also reflected itself in the rise of ODA from 2003 to 2004. Since there was 
a lack of coordination among Turkish government institutions and lack of awareness of 
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the international criteria before 2004, ODA figures could not be calculated properly 
(Personal Communication, July 15, 2014). 
This change is realized after TIKA was assigned to be the only institution that is 
responsible for coordinating Turkish ODA and collecting and reporting ODA data in 
accordance with OECD DAC criteria in 2005. From then on, TIKA has managed to 
transform itself into a new and modern development aid agency by completing ODA 
standardization and enhancing the number and scope of development aid activities. To 
reach this end, a number of experts have been entrusted with a task of conducting 
relevant studies and examining each public sector that contribute ODA in detail. 
Moreover, an electronic data collection program and an Assistance-in-Kind Budget 
Guide were developed in order to calculate the total value of the Turkey‟s development 
assistance. TIKA‟s 2005 Annual Report, which was generated as a consequence of 
numerous advisory meetings with the relevant agencies and international organizations, 
revealed a more enhanced and functional data collection. Following years, these 
changes have applied all TIKA report as well. Thanks to this development of TIKA 
reporting, TIKA‟s Annual Report of 2011 has been awarded with gold medal in the 
“Vision Awards” Competition hosted by the League of American Communications 
Professionals who selected the best communication and design applications from the 
5500 entries. Moreover, Turkish Development Assistance Report of 2012 has been 
awarded with silver medal among more than 6000 reports from 24 different countries. 
Besides, it was ranked as 40
th
 in Top 100 Worldwide (Personal Communication, July 
15, 2014). 
As a consequence of these developments in Turkey‟s foreign aid policy, Turkey 
has also identified its main objectives as joining the OECD DAC in the medium term. 
To this end, TIKA has aimed to accomplish necessary criteria for membership which is 
determined as having the ODA/GDP ratio of 20% per year which was fulfilled before 
the scheduled time. In accordance with this aim, Turkey has maintained an active 
dialogue with non-DAC member of OECD countries about the ways of improving aid 
effectiveness. For instance, in 2006 in Istanbul, Turkey hold a meeting on “Structured 
Dialogue” with the participation of “Inreach Group countries” which are non-DAC but 
OECD member countries; DAC members and representatives from the IMF; World 
Bank and UNDP. The focal point of the meeting was to discuss how the Inreach Group 
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countries could more efficiently apply the Paris Declaration in their ODA and their 
possible DAC memberships (TIKA, 2006). 
Turkey has also aligned with its foreign aid policy with the EU and MDGs 
which are determined by the UN in 2000. MDGs consist of 8 main international 
development goals: to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger;  to achieve universal 
primary education; to promote gender equality and empower women; to reduce child 
mortality; to improve maternal health; to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other 
diseases; to ensure environmental sustainability; to develop a global partnership for 
development. In TIKA‟s Annual Report of 2006, Turkey‟s ODA policy is analyzed 
through considering its contribution to the achievement of the MDGs. In this regard, 
four new areas of development assistance activities were added to the report: private 
flows, peace building, expenses made for refugees, contribution to the MDGs (TIKA, 
2006). 
TIKA‟s cooperation with prominent international development aid agencies, 
such as the United States Agency of International Development, Department for 
International Development and Gesellschaft fürr Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 
has also played an important role in the process of transformation of TIKA to modern 
development agency. Thanks to this cooperation, possible duplications while 
conducting projects has been prevented, and hereby invaluable time and sources have 
been saved for other individual or joint development assistance activities projects. As a 
consequence, TIKA could enlarge its dialogue and agreements with the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, International 
Fund for Agricultural Development, Islamic Development Bank, International Trade 
Centre, Economic Cooperation Organization, Asian Development Bank and many 
others development aid cooperation and projects (TIKA, 2006). 
The evolvement of TIKA to a modern development agency and its adjustments 
for aligning with the international aid community has underpinned the success of 
Turkish ODA policy. Having become a remarkable emerging donor has promoted 
Turkey‟s political power both in regional and international arena. Turkey has turned 
into a country which does not avoid taking a new international action for overcoming 
both regional problems and global issues. In this regard, while preventing global 
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poverty is becoming one of the most prominent concerns for Turkey, it has put much 
effort to solve ongoing problems in its surrounding regions as well.  
An Analysis of Turkish Foreign Aid Policy in the AKP Era 
As argued throughout this study, main aim of the study is to explain the change in 
Turkish foreign aid policy in the AKP era. Since TIKA‟s transformation has given a 
fresh impetus to this change, empirical part of this study is organized with respect to 
TIKA‟s organizational transformation as an outcome of the relationship among 
aforementioned contextual factors, the agent and main institution of Turkish foreign 
policy. In line with the main assumptions of HI argued in the first part of the study, 
dialectical relationship among the context, agent and the institution is tried to apply in 
explaining change in the Turkish foreign aid policy in the AKP era. By stressing to 
focus on dialectical relationship, this study gives equal weight to evolution of the 
concept of Westernization and domestic developments in the AKP era as explanatory 
determinants in explaining the policy change in Turkish foreign aid policy. In this 
regard, the study puts forward that the concurrent occurrence of these determinants have 
played an important role for emergence of this policy change.  
In line with the theoretical assumptions of the study, Westernization is 
determined as an institution; domestic developments are regarded as contextual factors, 
while TIKA is referred as the agent. Therefore, each of those determinants is explained 
in detail in previous parts with the aim of building a sound analysis.  In this section of 
the study, I try to analyze the path that Turkey becomes a donor country of foreign aid 
through unearthing the effect of dialectical relationship of those determinants.  
With the influence of new geographical imagination, the “West” has gained new 
meanings in the eyes of foreign policy elites of AKP government. This semantic shift of 
the concept helps Turkish foreign policy elites to enlarge the scope of Turkish foreign 
policy activities, without falling into conflict with the West. Yet, at this point, the 
interaction of this shift in the Westernization with the ideational structuring of Turkish 
foreign policy under the leadership of Davutoğlu should be highlighted. While the West 
has lost its meaning of reference to modern and civilized Turkey, it takes its final shape 
through Davutoğlu‟s concept of „central country‟. With the help of this new term in 
foreign policy, Turkey‟s long-lasting aim of becoming a Western country by fulfilling 
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its mission of bridge country seeps away in Turkish foreign policy formulation. Instead, 
the West has started to be pointed as a dominant international system which Turkey 
aims to be part of it as a central country. In this regard, becoming an important player in 
the world politics is determined as the main objective of Turkish foreign policy. To 
reach this end, Turkish foreign policy activities is organized through methodological 
and conceptual foreign policy principles identified by Davutoğlu.  
In contrast to the old perception of Turkish foreign policy which directs Turkey 
to follow isolationist and single-track foreign policy, Turkish foreign policy under AKP 
government has started to follow multi-dimensional approach via increasing its 
engagements with its near and wider surrounding regions due to the newly introduced 
foreign policy principles, tools and instruments. Under this schema of foreign policy 
formulation, the then Prime Minister Erdoğan stressed the criteria for being a strong and 
influential state have changed in the 21
st
 century by adding “the power, now, is 
measured by the contributions to peaceful world order, education, culture, solidarity, 
and sharing. What is more influential than crude power is the willingness to transform 
the world into a system based on equality and justice.” (Zaman, April 2013) 
In this regard, AKP foreign policy is arranged by the idea that Turkey should 
follow more responsible and proactive role in promoting regional peace and stability. 
This newly drawn roadmap is put forward as the most effective way to reveal the 
significance of Turkey‟s role by fulfilling its regional objectives to the West while 
contributing Western efforts in fighting against security threats and global problems. 
Moreover, foreign policy elites in the AKP era all agree about the importance of 
maintaining Turkey‟s role as a regional actor which enables Turkey to conduct its own 
interests and priorities in determining its own hegemonic position within the 
international arena. In line with this new direction in foreign policy, Turkey has stopped 
to perceive the outside through the eyes of the West. Instead, Turkey has preferred to 
make use of its connections with the West while it has also been expanding the scope of 
its foreign policy activities in the region and in an international arena.   
As an outcome of this new orientation, Turkey has become a country that takes 
advantage of every possible option that may support its own national interests. Instead 
of breaking its relations with the West, Turkey has realized the opportunity to extend its 
relations with its neighborhood countries where Turkey has strategic, geographical, and 
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historical linkages for being as one of the most important global player in Western 
dominated international system. The co-existence of the West and recent engagement 
policies of Turkey in several continents, which has always been seen as incompatible to 
the old foreign policy makers, is far from pointing a reorientation of Turkish foreign 
policy, rather it reveals Turkey‟s efforts to strengthen its hand with the aim of becoming 
a global player same as the major Western countries. In this regard, it can be argued that 
Western orientation has still constituted the genesis of Turkish foreign policy, yet it 
took a more flexible form of it.  
This theoretical and ideational transformation in Turkish foreign policy has 
mostly reflected itself in Turkish foreign aid policy in the AKP era. In a short period of 
time, Turkey has turned into a donor country from a receiver one. Furthermore, Turkey 
has become a country which is pursuing foreign aid activities in 110 countries ranges 
from Asia to Africa, Europe to Latin America and to the Middle East. Budget reserved 
for foreign aid policy in the AKP era has almost reached a billion dollar which is 3 
times more of the period between 1992 and 2003. Thanks to this change in Turkish 
foreign aid policy in 2000s, Turkey has gained a worldwide recognition and succeeded 
to be one of the most important players in international development arena. As a result 
of this success, Turkey was offered to be a member of OECD DAC which includes all 
major Western countries in development arena. However, to explain this change in 
foreign aid policy under the AKP government, it should be noted that along with the 
transformation of Turkish foreign policy and the Westernization genesis, domestic 
developments have all provided an appropriate ground to accomplish sufficient 
conditions for emergence of the change in foreign aid policy in Turkey.  
In this context, relative growth and stability in Turkish economy, political 
stability of the AKP era, and novel ideational structuring of Turkish foreign policy with 
the resurfacing of West can be regarded as major domestic supplementary elements of 
the success of Turkish foreign aid policy. Although these elements seem to refer 
different things, they have both positive effects on each other. Therefore, having 
promoted economic and political stability at the same time increases the country‟s 
capacity of maneuvering both in its domestic and foreign policy. Under the AKP 
government, specifically in its first and second term, Turkey has managed to take initial 
necessary steps in its economy and political policies. Thanks to democratization 
movements, Turkey has earned respect in the eyes of its neighborhood countries and in 
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the international arena which facilitate to implement and conduct more valuable and 
effective projects over those regions. When this democratization process was combined 
with the political stability thanks to the strong majority government rule, Turkey has 
turned into a more self-confident country in which political decisions has been taken in 
a more decisive and quick way.  
Along with the strengthened international image of Turkey, these improvements 
and self-confident stance in domestic arena has brought similar constructiveness in 
foreign policy arena. Besides, economic growth and stability has also generated 
opportunities for Turkey in conducting its foreign aid policy activities. Thanks to this 
relative economic recovery, Turkey has achieved to raise its foreign aid budget and to 
extend its scope of activities. More specifically, at a time when Western powers were 
shaking by the bad effects of global economic crisis, Turkey has come into prominence 
in the international development arena. As a matter of fact, Turkey has turned into an 
effective donor country which has been wanted and preferred by the receiver countries. 
Mostly, in the Middle East, Balkans, and Central Asian countries, Turkey has started to 
satisfy those countries‟ needs (Personal Communication, June 6, 2014).  
In this regard, both TIKA expert and bureaucrat from the Department Turks 
Abroad and Related Communities that I interviewed point out the mutually 
complementary presence of improvements in economy and domestic politics behind the 
emergence of effective foreign aid policy in 2000s. As they argue that in the lack of 
political stability and raising international profile of Turkey, foreign aid policy would 
not become effective even if the case of which Turkey‟s economy is much more better, 
or vice versa (Personal Communications, June 6, July 15, 2014). Therefore, it would not 
be mistaken to assert that Turkey has achieved to generate effective foreign aid policy 
by providing sufficient conditions thanks to the ideational-theoretical transformation of 
Turkish foreign policy and improvements in domestic and economic realms, which have 
been under responsibility of Turkey by itself.  
In the light of theoretical assumptions and empirical evidences examined in this 
study, it can be argued that domestic developments in the AKP era have made the 
emergence of assertive foreign aid policy of Turkey. Their dialectical relationship, 
where they all have mutual positive impact on each other, has strengthened Turkey‟s 
hand in this process. As I try to show in previous sections, concurrent existence of all 
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factors appears as the most important determinant of the change in Turkish foreign aid 
policy realized under the AKP government.  
Moreover, Turkish foreign aid activism reveals that Turkey has transformed into a 
country which seeks to be an important global player with a desire to contribute to 
global issues such as international security and international development. The role 
attributed to Turkey after the Cold War has become more evident and visible in the last 
decade. Furthermore, with the strategic depth doctrine of the then Foreign Affairs 
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey aims to become a country which does not turn its 
back to its neighboring countries and which also does not ignore global issues at the 
same time. To that end, as Keyman (2012) argues, “Turkey has no choice but to be 
innovative and active as a policy leader and globalization visionary.” (p. 74) Yet, it 
should not be disregarded that Davutoğlu‟s formulation offers a new vision which 
requires considering the variety of civilizations and reshaping international order as 
such (Aslan, 2013, p. 41). In this regard, Turkey‟s recent foreign aid activism and role 
in human security globalization should be regarded within this formulation.  
 As a means of becoming an important international player in the world 
which is becoming more globalized, more interdependent and more risky in terms of 
global turmoil in the wake of 9/11, Turkey‟s important journey with its commitment to 
political reforms, its economic growth and its proactive, dialogue-based global approach 
constituted the basis of recent foreign policy activities specifically Turkish foreign aid 
policy. Thus, establishment of Turkey‟s active foreign aid policy can be regarded as 
Turkey‟s response to immediate global crises while also aiming to follow long-term 
objective of contributing to global stability (Keyman, 2012, p. 75).  
 As regards the transformation of Turkey‟s image in the world, several 
scholars underline pivotal role played by Turkey at the global stage. For instance, 
Lenore Martin (2004) argues that Turkey have acted according to its redefined role in 
the aftermath of critical international events such as 9/11, US intervention in Iraq and 
growing anti-Western terrorism (p. 3). In addition to Martin, Graham Fuller (2008) 
identifies Turkey is the leading state among the Muslim countries and emphasizes 
Turkey‟s regional power in the post-9/11 by underlining its proactive foreign policy 
which became attractive recently.  
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Yet, recent foreign policy of Turkey is not seen without skepticism. As Keyman (2009) 
puts forward that there are two main criticism points against Turkey which are „strong 
ideological take‟ and „neo-Ottomanism‟. The former criticism approaches Turkish 
foreign policy as the continuation of ideological Islamist foreign policy while the latter 
refers to the overdependence on religious-based cultural affinities in Turkish foreign 
policy (p. 3). Although both ideological and religious affinities play an important role in 
Turkish foreign policy formulation of AKP, it would be misleading to argue that they 
are the only pillars of Turkish foreign policy. As the results presented in this study 
reveal, Turkish foreign aid policy is not only limited to Islamic societies. For instance, 
TIKA as the main conducting agency of the foreign aid does not have a religious focus 
as is seen its major activities in Africa took place in Ethiopia in 2005. In addition, 
although Ottoman past in terms of physical, cultural and diplomatic geography 
resurfaced in AKP‟s foreign policy, Turkish foreign policy activities does not stay 
limited with those areas; rather extending beyond its boundaries to from Africa to Latin 
America. 
 Turkey, through its global perspective, prefers multilateralism over 
unilateralism in its relations with other countries in the world. According to Keyman 
(2012), “new Turkish globalism is not simply an act of augmenting its power and 
influence or of revitalizing its Ottoman past to extend the sphere of its regional 
influence; on the contrary, it demonstrates its deep commitment to multilateralism and 
to enhanced cooperation as a way of making our world stable and peaceful.” (p. 75) 
Wide range of Turkish foreign aid activities towards numerous countries aiming to 
contribute economic development and human security can be regarded as in line with 
this aim.  
Within this formulation where the perception of the West has enlarged its 
boundaries and global point of view has become the pillar of Turkish foreign policy, 
proactive foreign policy has been increasingly institutionalized, as demonstrated in 
Turkey‟s foreign aid activities in the Middle East, the Balkans, Caucasus and Latin 
America, aimed at creating peaceful and stable relations with its near and far away 
neighbors and providing with them economic and cultural cooperation. In the light of 
the new visionary change in Turkish foreign policy, the „closeness‟ of these geographies 
and their „availability‟ for Turkey‟s involvement has been totally changed through the 
instruments of remembering past relations, unfolding cultural and civilizational 
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affinities, and exploring opportunities for engagement (Aras, 2009, p.6). Davutoğlu 
states that “Turkey‟s engagements from Chile to Indonesia, from Africa to Central Asia, 
and from the EU to the OIC will be part of a holistic approach to foreign policy. These 
initiatives will make Turkey a global actor as we approach 2023, the one hundredth 
anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish Republic.” (Davutoğlu, 2008, p. 96) 
 
 In this regard, the Department Turks Abroad and Related Communities 
deserves great attention as well. The main aim of the institution is to reach any place in 
which any citizen or relative of Turkish Republic is living. Since their relativity concept 
is based on the thousands years historical events, such as great immigrations, all the 
world is included to the scope foreign policy activities. Therefore, like it seen in the 
activities of TIKA or numerous civil society organizations, many state apparatus, as 
well, are having a global visionary in foreign policy formulation. In this sense, Turkey 
is becoming a country which is playing a role of a regional power focusing more and 
more on humanitarian aid and assistance as a way of contributing to making 
globalization more stable, humane, and just. It can be argued that Davutoğlu‟s new 
formulation which is referring to the historical-cultural affinities provides an advantage 
to Turkey in its involvement in neighboring regions and global issues (Aras, 2009, p. 7). 
 According to Keyman (2012), those recent developments in Turkish 
foreign policy have been referring its own unique brand of internationalism. He states 
that “Turkey‟s proactive and multidimensional foreign policy (...) symbolizes Turkey‟s 
expected role in the new global imagination that it is only through multilateralism 
activated on the basis of enhanced strategic partnerships, and by forging a more just, 
humane and interdependent world vision that the challenge of global turmoil can be 
addressed” (Keyman, 2009, p. 10) When all those developments specifically in Turkish 
foreign aid policy and generally in Turkish foreign policy are considered, it would not 
be mistake to argue that Turkey has started to follow global governance principles 
identified by Davutoğlu in the last decade. Although it is early to prove this argument or 
discuss the sustainability of those principles in Turkish foreign policy, empirical studies 
generates a suitable ground for developing global governance vision in Turkish foreign 
policy. Turkish foreign aid policy, as constitutes the empirical part of this study, sets an 
example of application of global governance principles which are inclusiveness, 
comprehensiveness, participatory representativeness, effectiveness, and finally future 
oriented-vision (Davutoğlu, 2009, p. 15). 
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CONCLUSION 
AKP government opened up a new page in Turkish political history during its rule for 
the last 12 years. Although the effects of AKP governing become tangible even in the 
present time, long-term effects are yet to be perceived in a bigger magnitude in the 
future. Thus, any study that attempts to understand and explain the underlying 
mechanisms of domestic and foreign policy of this era carries a great value for the 
literature. Although there are many studies conducted in line with this aim, there is still 
a greater need for more studies that aims to help understanding the general framework 
of Turkish politics at the present time. In this regard, this study can be considered as a 
humble attempt to fill a minor gap in the respective literature.  
 When the 92 years of Turkish political history is taken into account, it is 
observed that there are recurring concepts and strategies in domestic and foreign policy 
of Turkey. The foreign policy formulation which is determined by the motto of “peace 
at home, peace in the world” of the Kemalist establishment, isolationism in relations 
with other countries remained present despite the dramatic changes in the international 
structure. Isolationism and uni-dimensional foreign policy vision constituted the basis of 
Turkish foreign policy activities in the aftermath of the establishment of Republic and 
for the long years. Within this foreign policy formulation, being a follower of the West 
was seen as the only option for Turkey whose sole aim was to reach the level of 
Western civilization. Therefore, Turkey could not transform its geographical assets 
stemmed from its location at a critical point into a potential advantage due to respective 
foreign policy vision and domestic incapability. Moreover, Turkey restrained from 
following active policies towards its surrounding regions even when it has enough 
means in order not to be perceived as deviating from its Westernization mission which 
is in fact defined as an end in itself.  
 Throughout the Cold War years, structural obstacles entered into scene for 
Turkey in pursuing diversified foreign policy activities when even major countries of 
Europe was shaping their policies in line with US policies. In such an environment, 
alignment with the West became inevitable for Turkey. In the aftermath of Cold War 
years, new developments occurred with regard to foreign policy, especially during Özal 
government yet with limitations. In this period, Özal government developed certain 
policies towards Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries to strengthen the relations 
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with newly-independent Turkic states and to curb Soviet and Iranian influence in the 
region. However, insufficient economic and political conditions of the era prevented 
Turkish authorities from conducting successful and sustainable policies. This result did 
not come as a surprise in such an environment where Turkey had an unstable economy 
and domestic politics and low level of democratic consolidation. As a matter of course, 
Turkey which was not able to create a stable environment in domestic politics and not 
having a say in its surrounding regions could not gain reputation and prestige in the eyes 
of strong players of the global arena.  
 The main argument of this study is constructed on this framework of Turkish 
politics until the AKP era. Previous experiences reveals that having domestic 
capabilities and solid foreign policy vision have their own merit by themselves but lack 
of simultaneous emergence of these two factors hampered Turkey for having a powerful 
stance in the international arena. AKP‟s significance in Turkish political history 
becomes evident at this point since it was able to combine those factors. Concurrent 
occurrence of the political stability with consecutive electoral success of AKP; 
economic growth that started with the IMF stand-by packages after the 2001 economic 
crisis; and new foreign policy vision leaded by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Davutoğlu constitutes the prominent features of the AKP governance.  
When Turkish foreign policy in AKP period is taken into consideration, Turkish 
foreign aid policy drew great attention since it is the combination of those assets in this 
period. Having 80 years of experience as a receiver country of foreign aid, Turkey has 
turned into an important do not country and more specifically it became a significant 
regional and global player in this arena. This is the reason why this study starts its 
analysis with the aim of understanding the underlying mechanism of the remarkable 
change in Turkish foreign aid policy in the last decade.  
In the new foreign policy formulation of AKP, Westernization has no longer 
regarded as isolation. Rather, the commitment to West only changed its form as is seen 
in the critical events of the last decade such as 9/11 attacks, beginning of accession 
negotiations with the EU, and Arab Spring. Following those events, Turkey enhanced 
its influence in its surrounding regions and became more engaged with global issues 
through increasing its level of cooperation with the Western countries. Therefore, 
Turkey‟s policies have not contradicted with those of Western countries but it has no 
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longer remained only as a follower as well. Moreover, the problems originated from 
unstable coalition governments of previous years in the process of formulating and 
conducting a foreign policy is overcome by the AKP government. It was almost 
impossible to develop policies towards Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East 
simultaneously during previous governments‟ rule, AKP government has managed to 
conduct its policies in a wider area due to its homogenous structure.  
In addition, thanks to gains of democratization process, AKP government has 
not encountered suspicion in the countries where Turkey conducted policies about good 
governance. Although, the discourse of being a model country of the 1980s lost its 
weight in Turkish politics, Turkey has become a country which is pointed out by other 
countries as a role model as during the Arab Spring. Following these developments, 
Turkey has increased its visibility and reputation in the international arena as well as in 
the international organizations. Therefore, Turkey has turned into a country which uses 
its capabilities of conducting regional policies while engaging in global issues 
simultaneously as leverage for the first time in Turkish politics. The most prominent 
example of this change is seen when Turkey announced 2005 as „The Year of Africa” 
and implemented several foreign aid projects in the continent which in turn helped 
Turkey to ask for the support of the African countries in its attempts for becoming a 
non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.  
Aside from political stability and solid foreign policy vision, economic 
capabilities are also necessary conditions for Turkey in implementing wide range of 
activities in a wide range of geography. Thanks to the strengthening of economic 
indicators, Turkey could deliver high amount of money in foreign aid activities. Even, it 
became the 3
rd
 largest donor country with proportion to GDP while most of the 
European countries were still recovering from the economic crises.   
In the light of those contextual factors that are explained in more detail in the 
previous parts of this study, and the new interpretation of Westernization as main 
institution of Turkish foreign policy TIKA which is the main responsible body of 
Turkish foreign aid policy has undergone a major transformation as well. Although 
TIKA has a history of 22 years, in the first decade of its establishment it was not able to 
follow well-programmed agenda. All aforementioned problems with regard to domestic 
political structure and economic conditions of previous governments played an 
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important role in this failure. TIKA‟s activities were remained limited in scope and in 
numbers in this period. Yet, with the AKP government TIKA transformed itself into an 
agency which has 35 offices in 32 countries and operated in 110 countries from all 
continents and implemented projects ranges from Asia to Africa, Europe to Latin 
America and Middle East. Thanks to those developments, TIKA has turned into an 
agency which is pointed as a success story among the international foreign aid agencies 
and whose annual report of 2006 and 2011 were granted with international awards. 
Therefore, it can be argued that TIKA‟s success in 2000s can be seen as a total 
reflection of concurrent occurrence of political stability and democratization, economic 
growth, and novel ideational structuring of foreign policy vision. In this regard, 
studying transformation of TIKA since its establishment to present increases 
explanatory power of this study. 
The empirical evidence supports the hypothesis of this study in line with the 
theoretical assumptions of flexible version of HI. Dialectical relationship between the 
main institution, the agent, and the contextual factors constitutes the basis of the 
remarkable change in Turkish foreign aid policy in the AKP era. As the findings of the 
study reveal that overlooking the dialectical relationship among those three 
determinants would be a shortfall in analyzing the change in Turkish aid foreign policy. 
Therefore, it is possible to come to the conclusion that the AKP or a new government 
should focus on maintaining this potential in order to sustain and develop Turkey‟s 
foreign aid policy, and for even becoming a global player in the world politics. 
However, Turkey has encountered many problems with regard to democracy, 
economy, and foreign policy. AKP government has refrained from taking further steps 
in democratization process, from following more balanced fiscal and monetary policy, 
and from developing more effective policies in line with its main principles in its 
surrounding neighborhoods. In contrast to the progress on those areas obtained in 
AKP‟s first and second terms, AKP government has been facing some problems in 
maintaining this progress since 2008. One of the most prominent example of this shady 
environment was the local elections held in March 2014. Instead of creating more 
harmonious environment, the government has taken authoritarian measures which have 
stirred up polarization of society. Unfortunately, due to AKP government‟s harsh 
attitudes and its stance towards public demands, the clashes between public and police 
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forces escalated during Gezi protests and ended up with many sufferings and deaths of 
civilians.  
These recent developments have also been criticized by many Western countries 
and have caused them to question Turkey‟s ability to be an important global player that 
ponders world problems such as poverty, wars, reconstruction of underdeveloped 
countries, women killings and so on without overcoming its domestic problems in a 
democratic and peaceful way and fails to follow successful regional policies. Along 
with those authoritarian measurements of the government, corruption allegations about 
the government, mass arrests of journalists, political activists and police violence 
against anti-government demonstrators have harshly criticized by several states and 
international organizations. It is highly obvious that unless Turkey ameliorates its 
prestigious image in the international arena through its domestic and regional policies, 
its aim of becoming a powerful global player will be edging away eventually.  
In the last decade, it can be argued that Turkey‟s democracy has been facing a 
crucial test. Although it is too early to argue the impacts of undemocratic measurement 
of the government on Turkey‟s foreign policy and specifically on its foreign aid policy, 
Turkey should simultaneously concentrate and develop the contextual factors;  Turkish 
economy, democracy, political stability, new foreign policy vision to maintain the 
progress that was held by now. Since the development of all those factors is related in a 
dialectical manner, it is inevitable for Turkey to be successful in its foreign aid policy 
with the failure of some of those factors. In this regard, it is possible to come to the 
conclusion that the AKP or a new government should focus on maintaining this 
potential of Turkey to sustain and develop Turkey‟s foreign aid policy, and even for 
becoming a more powerful global player in the world politics. 
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